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i
“An examination of the situation over the past several years reveals that the In-
ternal Stability Pact has the effect of freezing a considerable amount of funds held
in the coffers of Italian municipalities, provinces and regions. Several billion euros
for public works are bound by the Internal Stability Pact. This has resulted in a
standstill both in new projects and those already underway. The unavailability of
these funds has also meant that public bodies are prevented from making payments
on time, which in turn has impeded economic recovery. The situation is made
worse, particularly in southern Italy, by the state of these coffers, which have been
tested by significant expenditure requirements and lower earnings. Even though the
Internal Stability Pact establishes planning parameters within which the Member
States can move autonomously, the prevailing opinion in Italy is that an exemp-
tion to this must be found at European level. Can the Commission answer the
following: Can exemptions be introduced in the Internal Stability Pact to allow
the aforementioned funds to be used to boost the economy and promote economic
growth?”
European Parlamentary Questions,
20 February 2013
University FEDERICO II
Napoli
Abstract
Essays on the Unintended Effects of Local Government Spending
by Immacolata Marino
With the introduction of the European Stability and Growth Pact most European
members introduced domestic fiscal rules to make all different levels of govern-
ment responsible for the control of central public accounts. There is a broad
debate on the suitability of the fiscal rules set in the Treaty of Maastricht and
in the Stability and Growth Pact. The present PhD’s thesis review the evolution
of Domestic Stability Pact in Italy (Chapter 1 ) and empirically investigate two
research questions. In Chapter 2 we explore the impact of capital expenditure
constraints on investments in public works. After 2008, the Italian central gov-
ernment strongly changed financial rules aimed at imposing fiscal discipline on
local governments. Municipalities subject to the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP)
collided with new stronger expenditure restrictions and tougher punishments for
non-compliers. This institutional change allows us to identify a causal relationship
between the DSP and investment in public works implementing a “Difference-in-
Differences” (D-i-D) design. Being exposed to the Pact reduces investment in
public works by 47% and number of auctions by 44%, while increases winning re-
bate by 5.5% and number of bidders by 16%. In Chapter 3 we evaluate the effect
of a reduction in investment for public works on new firm formation. The results
show that the amount invested in public works by local governments is a very
important determinant of new firm formation. A one standard deviation decrease
in total starting value decreases the entry rate for all firms by 21% and the entry
rate for construction firms only by 29%.
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1.1 Introduction
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) experienced two crucial pe-
riods during its evolution. On 7 February 1992 the Maastricht Treaty prepared
the ground for the Europe’s monetary union. Its main tasks were the creation of a
European Central Bank (ECB), the definition of rules for restructuring the mem-
ber’s fiscal polity1 and the “no-bailout rule” prohibiting the ECB from acquiring
public debt directly from the issuer2 (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2000).
At the European Amsterdam Summit in June 1997 a new instrument was in-
troduced to reaffirm the constraint on public finances, already defined with the
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) with the Maastricht Treaty. The new element
is the so called Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)3. Despite the progressive changes
in the SGP regulation during its living period, the basic rules to define an “exces-
sive deficit procedure” for States remain unchanged. The European constraints fix
the reference value for the central government Deficit-over-GDP ratio at 3% and
the central government Debt-over-GDP ratio at 60%. The motivation for imposing
these reference value is the need of putting under surveillance the medium-term
fiscal position of each European Member, in order to maintain it “close to balance
or in surplus”.
1Art. 103, 104 and 109 provides two fiscal policy instruments: the Excessive Deficit and
Mutual Surveillance Procedures
2Art. 104 of the Treaty and Art. 21 of the Protocol on the European System of Central
Banks
3The Stability and Growth Pact was originally based on three legal acts: Council Regulation
(EC) No.1466/97 on the question of the “surveillance” both of the control of budgetary positions
and the surveillance and coordination of economic policy, Council Regulation (EC) No.1467/97
on the issue of “speeding up” and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure
and finally Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact (97/C 231/01).
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The SGP defines also specific conditions under which Member States will be dis-
pensed with the rigid rules and be allowed to break the constraints without incur-
ring in the “excessive deficit procedure”. Despite this relative flexibility, the SGP
introduced more restrictive constraints than those originally provided by the Maas-
tricht Treaty. Rather than the SGP, the Treaty didn’t bind the central government
to follow any specific strategy to fulfill its reference value (Deficit-over-GDP ratio
less than 3%) and in particular it didn’t monitor any temporary output decline
over the period under surveillance.
These binding rules led to several doubts concerning their definition as well as their
benefits. Furthermore, several studies have addressed the issue of enforcement in
practice and have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of super-national rules. For
instance, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2000) not only state their pessimistic view
about the benefits of the SGP in terms of fiscal discipline, but also consider the
Pact as a significant cause in “diverting political effort from more fundamental
problems”. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) argue that the SGP is the main re-
sponsible for the immobility of the Euro area and they clearly propose to re-write
the Pact and pick up the question about the effect of the Pact for public invest-
ments. This issue is at the core of Balassone and Franco (2000) which stress
the problem of the public investments together evaluating “the pros and cons of
introducing a golden rule in EMU’s fiscal framework”.
The enter into force of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997 pushed EMU coun-
tries to define own regulation in term of sub-national rules. Because central gov-
ernments are the only responsible for their results at European level, the surveil-
lance imposed at supra-national level induced EMU central governments to exert
pressure over local entities through new fiscal regulations (Gastaldi and Giurato,
2009). Since 1999, Italy has adopted a set of rules defining fiscal constraints for
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local entities (regions, provinces and municipalities), known as Domestic Stability
Pact4. The decision on the budget constraints are taken by Italian Parliament
and the main feature of the Italian DSP is that its rules change potentially every
year.
Originally the Pact had a pure programmatic nature and it didn’t provide for any
indication about how to reach the fixed objectives. It was considered as a set
of rules aimed to realize targets shared by central government and local entities,
without any regulation regarding penalties. In this framework it is reasonable
that the DSP rules have been studied deeply and from different prospectives but
with contrasting results. Beyond the assessment of the effectiveness of fiscal rules
introduced with the DSP and the question of compliance, many other aspects re-
lated to the DSP constraints have attracted attention, particularly the fiscal rules
have been criticized because of its “excessively binding constraints for appropriate
counter-cyclical action” (Balassone and Franco, 2000). The link between public
investments and economic growth is generally accepted to be positive as well as
the link between fiscal consolidation and cut in capital expenditures is confirmed
by the venture of EU countries over the last decade. However there are no evi-
dence of the indirect effect of fiscal rules on microeconomic outcomes. The thesis
supported in our study is that the spending constraints imposed at local level not
only have repercussion in terms of local budgets but they also indirectly impact
local spending in public works and local firm dynamics.
The goal of this PhD’s thesis is then twofold. Firstly it aims at presenting an
accurate picture of the evolution of both supranational and subnational fiscal rules
in Europe, with particularly attention to the constraints set at the municipality
level in Italy.
4The Pact was introduced with the Financial Law 23 December 1998, n. 488/1998, art. 28.
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Secondly, it addresses two empirical questions:
• what is the effect of the reduction in investment for public works on auctions
outcomes?
• what is the impact of the drop in capital spending on firm dynamics?
We concentrate our attention on the Italian experience and specifically our analyses
are conducted at municipality level. The first version of the DSP in Italy has many
features differing from the recent rules. Over the period 1999-2006 the main target
of the Pact was the financial coordination and the contribution of local entities to
reach the central government fiscal objective. To prevent problems of compliance
in 2007 were introduced stronger supervisions and penalties.
This work evaluate the impact of DSP on local outcomes providing an analysis of
the effect of the new fiscal discipline introduced in 2009-2011. The new version of
the Pact turns attention to spending constraint without separate current expen-
ditures from capital expenditures. Our hypothesis is that this new “accounting
rule” induce exogenous variation in investment by local governments because “it
is easier to cut back or postpone investment spending than it is to cut current ex-
penditure” (Oxley and Martin, 1991:p. 161). Figure 1.1 shows the pattern of the
municipality spending for public works and for procurement of goods and services.
The evidence suggests that up to 2008 total value for investment in public works
is almost flat. However over the period 2009-2011 emerges a significant drop
in capital investment while total value of auction for current spending remain
unchanged. Starting from this evidence our goal is to assess the role of the DSP
in affecting municipalities’ spending decision.
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Figure 1.1: Local Government Expenditures
10000
15000
20000
25000
To
ta
l N
um
be
r o
f A
uc
tio
ns
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Year
Public Works
6000
7000
8000
9000
To
ta
l N
um
be
r o
f A
uc
tio
ns
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Year
Procurement of goods and Services
4
5
6
7
8
To
ta
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t (
ml
d)
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Year
Public Works
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
To
ta
l I
nv
es
tm
en
t (
ml
d)
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Year
Procurement of goods and Services
In order to carry out this grasping objective, our research is divided into three
parts, containing each several sections. Chapter I provides the description of the
European framework and the evolution of the DSP in Italy, providing a detailed
review of the existing literature. Chapter II and III empirically investigate the
two main questions previously exposed.
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1.2 Existing Literature
In the literature it is generally assumed that public infrastructure investment often
plays a strategic role in countercyclical fiscal policy. How the development of
infrastructures impact productivity and how its effect is related to the business
cycle are very discussed issues. There exist several contributions sustaining that
“government spending yields few economic benefits with large cost overruns and a
wasteful use of resources” (Leduc and Wilson, 2013: pag.1). On the opposite there
are also contributions standing for short -term effectiveness of public spending.
Leduc and Wilson (2013) evaluate the macroeconomic effects of investment in
infrastructure (they select highway spending) both empirically and theoretically,
using a rich and novel data set at the state level on highway funding, highway
spending, and numerous economic outcomes. They find that highway spending
impacts positively GDP both in the contemporaneous horizon then in a longer
horizon. The estimated multiplier of the contemporaneous effect is around 1.5
to 2.0 and this is a particularly notable result given the widespread opinion by
many that the stimulus of investment in infrastructure is effective exclusively in
the long-run.
They also find a long-run effect about the same size, around six to eight years after
the spending. An additional interesting finding of this paper is the result showing
that contemporaneous impact of highway spending takes place only for shocks
in period of recession, while long-run effects persist both during recessions and
expansions. This result is in line with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) which
have studied the effect of fiscal policies both in recession and in expansion. Several
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recent papers evaluate the effects of fiscal policy using variations in government
spending using cross-state comparison5.
From the European prospective, there is a large branch of literature that deal with
the question of taking public investment expenditures away from the definition of
the budget relevant for the SGP for its macroeconomic implications. In this contest
the introduction of a “Golden Rule”, excluding public investment spending from
the definition of the caps, has been proposed. According to this “Golden Rule”
investment spending would not enter in the computation for the definition of the
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)6 for the central government.
Balassone and Franco (2001) suggest that the rules set in the SGP may negatively
impact public investment expenditure but they also express their doubt on the
optimality of a “Golden Rule” for public investments. The view in favor of the
adoption of such a rule sustains the ability of investment to affect long-run growth.
With no constraints on investment EMU countries would be allowed to better
manipulate counter-cyclical budgetary actions and to use investment as instrument
to contribute to capital accumulation in a long term prospective. In the original
version of the SGP, for the definition of an “Excessive Deficit” there were any
difference between current and capital expenditures 7.
5Studies that analyze the effect of federal spending in the states on consumption, personal
income, employment: Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010), Shoag (2010), Chodorow-Reich et al.
(2011), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2010), Conley and Dupor (2011), Suarez Serrato and Wingender
(2011), Wilson (2012).
6An EDP is triggered whenever a country’s planned or actual deficit-to-GDP ratio exceeds
the reference value of 3%. In addition, an EDP can be launched in the case of a debt-to-GDP
ratio that is above 60% unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference
value at a satisfactory pace.
7Opinions on the adoption of a Golden Rule for investment spending are different. There is
a dated literature on the positive impact of excluding capital expenditures from the operating
budget: starting with Musgrave (1939), more recent Poterba and Robinson (1998 and 1999).
Points of view in favor of such a rule are expressed in Modigliani et. al (1998).
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Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) claim that the SGP could be re-written to take
into account important questions actually omitted from the regulation. The Pact
doesn’t provide any constraint on current government spending and from the view-
point of the Pact it doesn’t matter whether a Member State respect the budget
balance by incrementing or by reducing spending (given the level of taxes). This
is what happens also with the DSP at sub-national level, when the constraint on
local public spending is expressed with the principle of mixed competence. Lo-
cal entities have the possibility to autonomously decide whether to manipulate
current or capital expenditures in order to respect the DSP. We provide quasi-
experimentally that this method to calculate spending caps induce local entities
(municipalities) to cut investment in public works.
1.3 Sub-national Fiscal Rules
The central issue related to the adoption of fiscal rules both at supra-national and
sub-national level is their effectiveness in lowering budget imbalances. Although
a number of empirical studies have addressed the question of how fiscal rules are
associated with stable budget outcomes, the mixed conclusions they have reached
don’t allow to have a clear result on the effectiveness of fiscal rules. The common
element of this literature is the evidence of serious commitment problems.
Balassone, Franco and Zotteri (2004) provide a detailed review of the literature on
subnational fiscal rules in the European Union. The description of the evolution
of the application of sub-national fiscal rules in Europe is strictly related to the
change in structure of the budgetary rules adopted with the introduction of the
Treaty of Maastricht. Supra-national fiscal rules strongly reflect the new European
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context and triggered glowing debate on the effectiveness of fiscal rules. The new
rules reveal the interaction between EMU countries and their economics and the
need for a central authority in term of fiscal policy.
The new planning of the EMU fiscal policy in the direction of higher decentraliza-
tion implicates the threat of moral hazard problems. To address this issue there
were introduced both surveillance and budget procedures. Firstly, the definition
of a constraint to annual deficit with the final goal of taking under control central
government budgets. Secondly, these budget rules were subjected to surveillance
procedures and sanctions in the case of not compliance.
There exist several works describing and evaluating fiscal rules in the European
context. Kopits (2001) provides a detailed description of the evolution of fiscal
rules and in particular he focus on the novel rules introduced during the 1990s.
The idea underlying his study is that the final goal of fiscal rules is to make both
monetary and fiscal policies credible on policy interventions by limiting to the full
discretionary intervention. Therefore he outlines the evolution of fiscal rules and
notes that the last generation of rules, those introduced in the 1990s, points out the
urgency of transparency standards. Opposite to the negative evaluations of fiscal
rules, Kopits claims the need and the positive impact of fiscal rules on fiscal policy
using a political economy argument. He sustains, for example, that in election
time fiscal rules may play a key role in restraining policymakers interests and
guaranteeing that they take into account also future implications of their decisions.
He analyzes the effectiveness of fiscal rules at national and subnational levels
and draws interesting conclusions about the relation between countries’ features
and effectiveness of fiscal rules. Indeed the impact of constraining governments’
behavior is different if we apply them in countries with strong or fragile fiscal
policy reputation.
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Our study is on the effect of constraints on public spending at local level and it
is related to the discussion of Atkinson and Van den Noord (2001) on local public
expenditures. They review public expenditure patterns and provide description of
public expenditure policies of OECD countries discussing them from three prospec-
tives: macroeconomic sustainability, allocative and technical efficiency. They point
to the role of transparency in improving effectiveness of fiscal rules and in partic-
ular of those rules directly involving expenditures. Among these studies analyzing
the role of fiscal rules in controlling budget imbalances, our novel contribute is to
go beyond the only effect on balances. We also evaluate the “unintended” effect
of those rules on auctions for public works and firm dynamics.
With the application of the SGP to EMU countries, rules for regulating different
levels of government were introduced in developed countries to make local entities
as responsible as the central government in containing budget imbalances. The ob-
jective of these rules is twofold: i) they are intended to guarantee macroeconomic
stability at national level; ii) they tend to promote and intensify decentralization at
local level (Joumard et al., 2005, p.5). The efficiency of fiscal rules at sub-national
levels is strictly related to the level of decentralization in a country. Particularly
crucial for the effectiveness of fiscal constraints is the structure of financial rela-
tionships existing between different level of governments. Rodden (2002) identifies,
among the most decisive factors, the existence of broad fiscal gap or the presence of
fiscal imbalances at local level. This is linked to the lack of coordination between
transfers from the central government and local expenditures. The incompatibility
between local and central behavior on public funds planning directly depend on
the presence of fiscal imbalances at local level. The existence of fiscal imbalances
induces local entities to distort central transfers allocation toward excessive local
spending. Therefore it is necessary for central government to control sub-national
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balances and to create an efficient mechanism to avoid financial collapses.
Giurato and Gastaldi (2009) provide a detailed classification of the existing fiscal
rules. They classify fiscal rules applicable at sub-national level in the following
groups:
• Rules on budget balances defined on different types of budget, predicted or
approved, and they are very elementary but they can be ineffective if they
provide many exception to considerfrom time to time.
• Expenditure constraints applicable in the form of upper limits on expenditure
or on the growth rate of expenditure. The negative side of this type of rules
is that they often consider some items as administrated “off-budget”and this
make impossible to perfectly control the accumulation of debt positions. This
may produce allocative inefficiencies if local entities are allowed to choose
which component of spending to cut. It is reasonable that sub-national en-
tities reduce the expenditure that is most flexible in the short term, like
investment expenditure. This point is particularly related to our view in
this paper and it is in line with our finding. We show that the introduction
of the “mixed accrual” principle to calculate expenditure caps induce a de-
crease in capital spending. Local entities are not motivated to cut current
expenditures (education, personal services, health care, etc. ) if they can
easily manipulate capital spending.
• Ceilings on the own revenue of sub-national entities used as an instrument
to punish entities not complying with the sub-national rules.
• Limits on the stock of debt or on the issuance of new debt. These are es-
pecially supra-national rules. They fix a certain cup to the debt or to the
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debt over GDP ratio. If these rules are applied to local entities they can be
deceived by transferring debt to other local government entities that are not
subject to the constraints.
• Restrictions on the type of expenditure that can be financed with debt. These
are usually implemented for investment spending. Establishing that only
investment expenditure can be financed with debt is equivalent to state a
differentiated rule between current and capital expenditures. There is a deep
debate on the optimality of a “golden rule” for public investment spending,
however there are many doubts on the efficiency of such rule. Its effectiveness
is indeed strictly associated to the definition of investment spending and the
possibility to redefine as “investment” very heterogeneous items. Moreover,
they do not appear to be able to guarantee the macroeconomic sustainability
of the debt (Daﬄon, 2002). The debate on how to subtract productive
investment from the fiscal rules is an open issue.
• Limits on the debt linked to the cost of debt service or indicators of the ability
to service the debt.
Beyond the adoption of one or the other rule, the necessary condition to be effective
is the possibility of constituting a credible commitment between local entities and
central government. Several elements cooperate to reach this goal, especially ex-
ante and ex-post monitoring of budget data and ex-post punishment in terms
of transfers from central authority. Among these constraints it is not uniquely
defined the optimality of one rule or the efficiency of a combination of them.
The need of fiscal rules at local level is less necessary for high decentralized entities
because they are less exposed to the moral hazard issue. Central governments may
choose between many fiscal rules to regulate local entities’ budget. These rules are
Chapter 1. The Italian Domestic Stability Pact and its Shortcomings 14
not fully effective in monitoring local public finances if they are not combined with
credible commitments on the central governments’ side. In order to reach the final
target, the central government has to define fiscal rules taking into account many
factors that contribute to make them effective. Central governments may decide
if simply impose to local entities its rules or if discuss with local governments the
structure of fiscal rules to adopt, they may define final targets or constrain sub-
national entities to ex-ante monitoring of the budgetary position. The propensity
to adopt one or more constraints should be dictated by the peculiarity of the
framework in which the rules will work. Particularly, it should be the case that
the choice of sub-national fiscal rules will be made taking into account the supra-
national objectives. In the presence of an external target, such as the SGP, it is
recommended to define domestic rule in the same form of those applied to the
central government. Specifically, if the external target is the budget balance it is
reasonable to define also domestic objective in terms of budget balance.
1.3.1 The International Setting
The approach to the possibility of adopting a “Golden Rule” for investment spend-
ing differs between European countries and more in general in the international
contest. The rules constraining local entities were differing in several ways to those
promoted under SGP (Mintz and Smart, 2006).
The different EMU countries have adopted many different approaches to engage
the fiscal policies introduced with the SGP. In some cases the central governments
have introduced completely novel regulation on local entities’ fiscal rules, while
in other countries they have just modified already existing rules governing local
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entities. Before the introduction of the SGP indeed the level of fiscal decentral-
ization was very different among EU countries. Some countries, such as Austria,
Belgium, Germany and Spain already had fiscal rules at local governments level,
contributing to central government in reaching the Maastricht objectives. In other
countries, such as Italy, Finland and Netherlands, the need to put under control
local entities’ budget rise after the creation of the EMU.
All the EMU countries have adopted an annual budget constraint8both at federal
states level and at local governments level. The experiences of Austria, Belgium,
Germany and Spain represent example of failed approach to fiscal rules in the pe-
riod before the SGP. During that period the rules followed to control local entities
in those countries don’t achieve their expected results in term of local governments’
balance budgets. However a common element of the European experience is that
the achievement of the fiscal constraints target mainly depends on the degree of
decentralization in the country.
Among EMU countries it is possible to distinguish two different approaches to the
adoption of fiscal rules: some countries have adopted a cooperative approach, such
as Belgium and Germany, other countries have followed the imposed approach,
such as Austria, Italy and Spain. Originally, in the most of these countries the
constraints were not on expenditures but on the balance and ofter combined with
an higher cap to local debt.
The results from the cooperative approach are mixed. In Belgium the process
of coordinating budgetary objectives at different levels of government lead to a
8See Giurato and Gastaldi (2009) for a detailed description of the EMU countries fiscal rules.
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sustainable budget situation both for regions and municipalities. This fiscal re-
straints contributed to a considerable reduction in public local debt. The coop-
erative approach didn’t deliver expected results in Germany. The high degree of
decentralization of local entities required a supervision to coordinate budget plan-
ning between different levels of governments. With the introduction of European
constraints the Planning Council fulfill the role of supervisor to monitor fiscal
behavior of local entities and to correct their fiscal behavior.
Even though Austria and Spain are countries in which imposed budget rules works,
cooperation is an important feature to make these rules effective. Spain is an
example of coordination between increasing decentralization and budget stability
during the 1990s. The target of constraints was mainly in terms of local debt.
However this experience was not successfully in obtaining expected objectives and,
with the introduction of the SGP, in 1999 Spain introduced a revised set of fiscal
rules aimed to face supranational regulation. The budget target was rewritten on a
three years basis. The peculiarity of the Spanish case is the introduction, with the
revision of 2005, of a “Golden Rule” on spending for investment projects. A special
case is represented by the experience of France. Here there was not introduced any
formal Domestic Stability Regulation but central government issued a set of laws
aimed to reinforce fiscal autonomy of local entities and at the same time imposed
fiscal discipline without negotiations among different levels of governments.
The European goal to ensure the sustainability of state budgets has resulted in
the introduction of the Fiscal Compact in 2012. The purpose of the new Fiscal
Compact is to strengthen budgetary discipline in the member states of the Euro-
zone. The main feature of this revised regulation is the introduction of a “golden
rule” requiring that annual budget of member governments be balanced. This rule
is a crucial novelty of the European integration process because it expresses a clear
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interest to directly affect the states’ behavior. While with the SGP regulation
member states were requested to maintain their public deficit below the yearly
ratio of 3% of the GDP and the total public debt below 60% of the GDP, with
the Fiscal Compact introduces specific rules that central governments have to
follow in fulfilling their final goals. The process of fiscal decentralization and
fiscal monitoring at sub-national level is strictly related to the external constraints
imposed at central governments from EU.
1.4 The Process of Fiscal Consolidation in Italy
The Italian public debt has its origin in the mid-1960s when public debt increased
rapidly from less than 30 percent of GDP in the mid-1960s to 80 percent in the
mid-1980s and to over 120 percent of GDP by the mid-1990s (Balassone et al.,
2008).
Figure 1.2: General Government Net Borrowing and Debt
Source. Balassone et al. (2008).
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Figure 1.2 from Balassone et al. (2008) well describes the dramatic evolution of
the Italian gross debt after the 1960. This unsustainable pattern of public finances
induced policymakers to undertake an adjustment process of the public accounts
starting in the mid-1980s and still in progress. The figure also shows how the
way of fiscal consolidation in Italy was launched before the introduction of the
DSP. The process of public accounts adjustment started in the mid 1980s and the
fiscal rules adopted in 1999 with the DSP only represents the recent phase of this
process.
The process of fiscal decentralization in Italy started in the early 1990s when the
central transfers to local entities decreased dramatically and by 1997 they dropped
to around 60% (as the share of transfers that central government reserves to local
governments). Figure 1.3 represents the pattern of “State transfers as a share of
local government revenue” and clearly shows how the fiscal autonomy of local en-
tities measured by the transfers from the central government grew gradually over
the 1990s. However it remains rather unchanged after the introduction of the DSP.
Figure 1.3: Central Government Transfers to Local Entities
Source. Balassone et al. (2008).
Chapter 1. The Italian Domestic Stability Pact and its Shortcomings 19
The need to combine this country specific process of fiscal consolidation with a
large-scale project at European level results in the introduction of the DSP. The
Pact is a set of fiscal rules adopted by Italian Parliament since 19999 with the
objective of involving all local governments in reaching the EU public finances
target. In Italy DSP regulation is always defined together the yearly Financial
Law. Still it represents the crucial instrument to coordinate the public finance
between central government and local entities. That of coordination remains the
main problem that single states face in applying fiscal rules and in guaranteeing
the success of the domestic budget balances. Indeed the non centralized contest
in which public finances are defined suggests the need of coordination between
different level of governments. The DSP rules are ever defined within the financial
measures setting (except for the 2002) and their identification is revised year after
year in order to adapt them to the new economic and financial setting.
Domestic Stability Pact: the Italian evolution
Originally the DSP was imposed to all subnational entities (regions, provinces
and municipalities) and its main target was the reduction of aggregate deficit
with respect of a given target. Since 2002 some municipalities (those below 5,000
inhabitants) and other local entities were excluded from the commitment to respect
the DSP rules. Figure 1.4 shows municipalities subject to the DSP in the period
between 2002 and 2012 (on the left) and in the period starting from 2013 (on the
right).
9Law n. 488/1998, art. 28
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Figure 1.4: Municipalities affected by Domestic Stability Pact
above 5,000
below 5,000
No data
2002−2012
above 1,000
beow 1,000
No data
2013−
The extension of the DSP rules to municipalities between 1,000 and 5,000 inhab-
itants represents a significant change in the evolution of the DSP because of its
increase in entities involved in the constraints. While up to 2012 only 30% of Ital-
ian municipalities were interested to DSP rules (2,320 with respect a total number
of 7,712 municipalities), with the new regulation10 about the 77% of the Italian
municipalities is subjected to the DSP regulation (5,974 municipalities). In this
situation of increasing restraints in terms of both objectives and size of interested
entities, it is crucial to quantify the real effect of DSP in order to evaluate its
10Law 24 December 2012, n. 228
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impact not only in term of fiscal target effectiveness.
Figure 1.5: Distribution of the Population Size
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In particular, since 2002 DSP municipalities were not only involved in reaching a
final target in term of fiscal sustainability, but also subjected to specific current
expenditure constraints. The spending constraint was intended to correct budget
imbalances at local level. In 2005 the new DSP rules were reviewed to constrain
the growth of local entities’ spending and also capital expenditures were included.
Starting from 2006 the regulation was rewritten and, with the goal of improving
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efficiency of local government spending, a differentiation between current and cap-
ital expenditure constraints was introduced. The new regulation required current
expenditure to be reduced while recommending to improve capital expenditures,
always in the limit of budget balance. This differentiation between current and
capital expenditures vanished since 2009, when local entity-specific balance target
started to be calculated in terms of “mixed competence”. With the principle of
mixed competence each local authority may decide which instrument manipulate
to respect the final target (current or capital expenditures). The monitoring fea-
ture also withstand to important innovations. First, introducing the obligation
for local governments to inform the Ministry of the Economy about the fulfillment
of the target in terms of mixed competence; second, in term of sanctions which
specifically tend to make different the spending behavior of local authorities11.
We have underlined that the exact DSP rules constraining the expenditure caps
changed from one year to another, but over our sample period it changed dras-
tically in 2005, that is the first time it was introduced, and from 2008 and 2009
when the principle of mixed competence was adopted. Table A.1 summarizes the
evolution of the DSP between 1999 and 2011. The expenditure cap was introduced
in 2002 only for current expenditures then extended also to capital spending in
2005. The principle of mixed competence, already existed in the period 2007-2008
with a target period reference, however since 2009 the spending cap benchmark
is calculated with respect a specific year 2007. Constrained municipalities are not
allowed to spend more than a fixed amount for capital expenditures and they are
subjected to mechanisms of both rewarding and punishment respectively in the
cases of good or bad behavior.
11See Giurato and Gastaldi (2009) for a detailed description of the evolution of the Domestic
Stability Pact in Italy.
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In the next two chapter, using the change in DSP regulation of the 2009, we
identify some of the potential unintended effect of constraining capital expendi-
tures. In Chapter 2 we explore the impact of this capital expenditure constraints
on investments in public works. Municipalities subject to the Domestic Stability
Pact (DSP) indeed collided with new stronger expenditure restrictions and tougher
punishments for non-compliers. This institutional change allows us to identify a
causal relationship between the DSP and investment in public works implementing
a “Difference-in-Differences” (D-i-D) design. Being exposed to the Pact reduces
investment in public works by 47% and number of auctions by 44%, while increases
winning rebate by 5.5% and number of bidders by 16%. In Chapter 3 we evaluate
the effect of a reduction in investment for public works on new firm formation.
The results show that the amount invested in public works by local governments
is a very important determinant of new firm formation. A one standard deviation
decrease in total starting value decreases the entry rate for all firms by 21% and
the entry rate for construction firms only by 29%.
Chapter 2
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2.1 Introduction
Can financial constraints imposed at local governments level have impact on pro-
curement auctions for public works? The introduction of a European multilateral
supervision of public finances of EU members states, with the Maastricht Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in the early and mid-1990s, induced
most Member States to extend constraints on deficit and debts to all local public
administrations. Despite extensive debate on the impact of fiscal and financial re-
straints on debt accumulation and their effectiveness in reducing budget deficits,
very little is known about their role in reducing public spending, and specifically
capital expenditures. Oxley and Martin (1991) point to “the political reality that
it is easier to cut back or postpone investment spending than it is to cut current
expenditure” and De Hann, Strurm and Sikken (1996) argue that investment “is
the least rigid component of expenditure” (see Balassone and Franco, 2000).
Starting from the recent debate, this paper investigates two issues: (i) the im-
plication of the DSP for local investment in public works and (ii) the effect of
decreasing investments on procurement auctions’ outcomes. We first show quasi-
experimentally that capital expenditure constraints do matter for restraining in-
vestments in public works. Then we present the empirical evidence suggesting
that the reduction in the total reserve price put up for auctions contributes to
lower the average number of bidders per auction and to decrease final price of the
contract.
Since 1999, Italy has adopted the so-called Domestic Stability Pact (DSP) aimed
at ensuring that the Local Government sector pursues an overall balance of public
finances. In 2001 the central government relaxed it for municipalities below 5,000
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inhabitants, from then on only municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants are subject
to the DSP regulation. After 2008, the Italian Central Government strengthen the
rules of the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP) and municipalities subject to the policy
collided with new stronger expenditure restrictions and tougher punishments for
non-compliers. This policy change allows us to combine two sources of variation,
before/after 2008 and below/above 5,000 inhabitants and implement a Difference-
in-Differences (D-i-D) design. This natural experiment strategy is implemented
by comparing the difference in average behavior before and after the reform for
the eligible group with the before and after contrast for a comparison group. The
D-i-D design is a powerful tool in measuring the average effect of the DSP on the
reduction in investments by municipalities exposed to the DSP. It does this by
removing unobservable individual effects and common macro effects by relying on
two critically important identifying assumptions of (i) common time effects across
groups, and (ii) no systematic composition changes within each group.
The empirical analysis can be divided into three parts. First we implement a stan-
dard D-i-D design, assuring the validity of its identification assumption, in order
to analyze the average impact of the change in DSP rules on investment in public
works (both value and volume of contracts) and auctions’ outcome variables. We
consider as reference sample all municipalities and all contracts for public works,
without any distinction between different adjudication methods and different con-
tracts’ types (Roads, Buildings, etc.). The results show that the DSP significantly
reduces the amount of local resources dedicated to investment in public works, by
around 1 million Euros per municipality over the course of the three years after
the reform. Results survive a large number of robustness checks. Among those, we
use only municipalities above 1,500 inhabitants in order to balance the number of
observations in the treatment and in the control group and to exclude very small
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cities that need fewer intervention in terms of public infrastructure.
In the second part of the empirical analysis we investigate the heterogeneity of
the responses to the DSP, focusing on the effect of the DSP on auctions’ outcome:
winning rebate, number of bidders and chance to win the auction. The Public
Procurement System in Italy contemplates two main possibilities for the adjudi-
cation of an auction for public works. The first is a price method, the second is
a price & quality criterion, known as “beauty contest”T˙he difficulty of specifying
and evaluating criteria for a beauty contest makes this a nontransparent mecha-
nism and pushes us to exclude this type of auctions from our analysis. Indeed,
some contracting authorities acknowledge that they prefer beauty contests pre-
cisely because of the possibilities for supporting their “favorite participants” over
other firms. But such behavior is unlikely both to safeguard competition and to
benefit consumers (see Binmore and Kempler, 2002).
Among the price auctions two different selection mechanisms may be performed:
the First Price Method (FPA) or the Average Bid Method (ABA). FPAs are be-
lieved to induce lower procurement costs through competition and lower corruption
through transparency. Numerous theoretical studies have shown that the poor ex
post performance of FPAs could derive from either adverse selection, when bidders
differ along their unobservable cost of reneging their bid (Spulber, 1990), or moral
hazard, when the contract is incomplete (McAfee and McMillan, 1986), or the
winner’s curse (Kagel and Levin, 1986). Conley and Decarolis (2013) shed light
on the collusive feature of the Average Bid Method. In order to take into account
this structural difference between FP and AB adjudication methods, we investi-
gate separately the effects of the DSP both on FPAs and ABAs. The main result
is that the effect of the DSP on the winning rebate is statistical significant only for
Chapter 2. Local Government Spending and Public Procurement 28
FPAs, in line with the theoretic competitive feature of this type of adjudication
method.
Finally, we exploit the heterogeneous effects of the Pact among treated municipali-
ties. Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano (2013) explain that a standard cross-sectional
Regression Discontinuity (RD) design would not allow to identify the effect of DSP
in this setting because the presence of another policy, started in the 1960s and still
in place, according to which mayors of cities above 5,000 residents receive a higher
salary. The presence of this confounding policy implies that analyzing the discon-
tinuity at 5,000 inhabitants in any given year would not identify the effect of the
DSP. In their analysis the authors propose a different cross-sectional approach,
that they call “difference-in-discontinuity” (diff-in-disc) design. This strategy al-
lows them to identify the effect of the DSP for municipalities in the neighborhood
of 5,000. Similar to their strategy, the D-i-D estimates in the neighborhood of
5,000 inhabitants would identify the effect of the DSP on the small DSP munici-
palities. This suggests that there are heterogeneous responses to the DSP among
the treated municipalities, in particular the effect on small treated it is not statis-
tically significant. An explanation for this result is given in terms of compliance
and we discuss how delays in payments represent an alternative to investments
cut.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents related literature and anticipate
the contribution of the analysis. Section 3 illustrate the institutional frameworks:
a detailed picture of the Italian Public Procurement System and a description of
the evolution of the Domestic Stability Pact regulation in Italy. Then in Section
4 there is a sketch of the database used for the empirical analysis and preliminary
descriptive statistics. Section 5 describe the empirical strategy and its assumptions
validity. In section 6 we present and discuss empirical results. Section 7 assesses
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the robustness of the results and extend the analysis taking into account of the
differences between FP and AB auctions. Finally, in Section 8 we conclude that
DSP reduces the overall level of investments in public works and for FPAs increases
the level of competition lowering final price.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First it is related to the
literature that analyze the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In particular there is a large
number of empirical studies that have addressed the question of the effectiveness of
sub-national fiscal rules in reducing budget imbalance (see Balassone, Franco and
Zotteri, 2004 for survey) and in restraining fiscal policy (see Alesina and Perotti,
1996 and Wyplosz, 2012). One of the principal reason why fiscal rules might
not work is the lack of enforcement. This problem, however, is more relevant at
national level because more or less all local governments are under tight control
and subjected to cutting founds for future transfers. In this paper we focus on
the effects of financial rules on public spending, particularly in public spending
for investment. There is also an important branch of existing literature that has
discussed the possibility of introducing a Golden Rule to contrast the impact of the
DSP on public investment spending (see Balassone and Franco, 2002). Starting
from the recent debate, this paper empirically analyze the causal relationship
between the DSP and the drop in investment for public works.
Second this paper contributes to the literature that has analyzed the role of com-
petition on final price of contracts in public procurement auctions. Coviello and
Mariniello (2013) find that an exogenous variation in publicity plays an important
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role in increasing both entry and winning rebate. We find that an exogenous in-
crease in the number of bidders is associated to an increase in the winning rebate
only in FPAs which stands in line with the competitive feature attached to FP
mechanism. As regard the difference in outcomes between FP and AB methods,
Cameron (2000) and Decarolis (2012) focus on the trade-off between price and
quality induced by First Price auctions. Ashenfelter et al. (1997) study the effect
of competition on quality in FPAs. They evaluate the effect of a policy favoring
competition in 378 construction contracts and find evidence of worsening perfor-
mance. Compared to these study the contribution of this paper is to take into
account the role of the investments’ level in determining competition and price.
2.3 Institutional Framework
2.3.1 The Italian Public Procurement System
The main steps of the Italian Public Procurement System for public works are as
follows. First, the public administration announces a call for tender following the
principles of publicity and transparency in force and illustrates the contract char-
acteristics. Sealed bids are submitted in the form of a discount over an announced
reserve price (rebate). The key rules on the contractors’ selection concern the
specification of the type of procedure and the criterion for determining the win-
ner. Procedures might be “open” or “restricted” according to the method adopted
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for the presentation of the offers1. In an opened procedure all interested parties
are allowed to present an offer, while in the restricted procedure only invited par-
ties may submit their offers. Both open and restricted procedures can use “lowest
price” or “economically most advantageous offer” criteria.
In the selection of the winner only the price is considered in a lowest price de-
sign, not only price but a sample of other parameters is contemplated when the
economically most advantageous offer criterion is adopted2. Contracts for public
works are typically procured through auctions based only on price but in the last
ten years the economically most advantageous offer method is strongly increasing.
As regard the awarding criterion two distinct mechanisms exist: first price auctions
(FPAs) and average bid auctions (ABAs). In a FPA the winner is the highest
“reliable” rebate. An offer is considered “reliable” if the PA judges that the bidder
can fulfill the contract at the condition promised. When the starting price of an
auction is below the European threshold, the PA is not obliged to evaluate the
“reliability” of rebates. If there is no evaluation of any offer the highest rebate
always win the auction. If the automatic exclusion is performed the entrepreneur
offering the lowest price always loses the auction. This is the crucial feature of an
1There are four main types of contract award procedure: the open procedure (or public
auction): all firms that wish to may participate provided they fit the criteria for the type of
work and the price. The restricted procedure (or private treaty): all firms invited by the relevant
public administration may take part in the tendering procedure. The negotiated procedure: can
be used for contracts of less than 500,000 Euros (except for urgent works for which the limit
can be exceeded); the competing companies (at least 5) are selected and invited to submit a
tender by the contracting authority. The competitive tender: applicable for operations with a
significant architectural element. In this procedure, a candidate draws up a project related to
the services requested, based on the requirements of the administration, proposing the conditions
and prices he is prepared to offer for the contract.
2According to EU’s procurement directives, Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, articles
55 and 53, respectively, the winning bidder in a public procurement auction can be nominated
on the basis of price only, subject to the bidder meeting minimum quality requirements, or,
alternatively, to the economically most advantageous bid. The economically most advantageous
bid can be the bid with the highest quality for a given price, in so-called beauty contests. It can
also be the bid that achieves the highest combined price and quality score.
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ABA mechanism. The exact rules for automatic elimination of bids differ between
countries3 but this design is rather common around the world.
In Italy if the AB mechanism is adopted the winning offer is selected in the fol-
lowing way. First, rebates are ordered from the lowest to the highest. Then the
10% of the highest and lowest discounts are eliminated. The arithmetic mean
(Ravg) is calculated with these remaining offers. Then the average difference be-
tween Ravg and rebates greater than Ravg is computed and added to this Ravg.
The resulting point is the “anomaly threshold”: T . The winner is the highest
bid below the “anomaly threshold”: Rwin. The PA also decides and declares in
the announcement if it will exercise automatic exclusion of those offers above the
anomaly threshold (AB mechanism). Figure 1 shows an example with thirteen
bids.
Contractual conditions are expressed in the call for tender (value of the contract,
type of procedure, awarding criteria, deadline and possibility of subcontracts),
however there is the possibility of partially renegotiating some terms of the contract
(the time of delivery and the cost of the project). In this paper we don’t consider
renegotiations that represent the crucial object of studies focusing on the trade-off
between price and quality induced by FPAs for public works (both theoretical and
empirical) because we are focusing only on the final price of the contract.
The Italian regulation governing the award of public works is ever-changing with
many local exceptions. Two systematic reforms affected the national regulation
over the last fifteen years, first in 1994 and then in 20064. During this time span
the FP method was ever compulsory for all contracts for public works with a
3See Conley and Decarolis (2012) for a discussion.
4First with The Legge 109/94 (known as Legge Merloni) and its several amendments (Merloni-
bis in 1995, Merloni-ter in 1998), than with The Decreto Legislativo (DL)163/2006 (known as
The Code of Public Contracts ) and its several amendments (The DL 152/2008 ) and (The DL
201/2011 ).
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reserve price above the EU threshold (approximately 5 million). In the period
between January 2000 and June 2006 the regulation mandated the use of ABAs
for all contracts with reserve price below the European threshold. In 2006 with
the new regulation, the recourse to ABAs became elective as long as the PA had
point it clear in the announcement. Then, in 2008, the FPAs became compulsory
for all contracts above 1 million, leaving the possibility of using the AB method
only for contracts below this threshold. Starting from the May of 2011 the rules
reverted into the regulation originally introduced in 2006 and it is still in force up
to December 2013. The living matter in literature of public procurement debates
about the optimality of one of the two designs. Decarolis (2012) use the different
timing in introduction of FPAs after the 2006 reform to compare costs and benefits
of FPAs and ABAs. It’s study finds that FPAs lower the winning price but also
worsen ex-post performance. This paper is about the effect of the DSP on invest-
ment in public works and it contributes to previous empirical studies taking into
account the volume of auctions as determinant of winning price, in addition to the
peculiarity of the auction’s procedure. Using the information about the auction
adjudication method, in the second part of the analysis we investigate the effects
of the DSP on winning rebate in the two different awarding settings. Results show
that less auctions do not induce lower winning price in ABAs, while winning rebate
increase with the decreasing in the value of auctions in FPAs. Taken togheter, the
theory and the evidence suggest that the winner’s curse effect is large enough in
ABAs, more than compensate for the increase in competition.
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2.3.2 The Italian Domestic Stability Pact
In Europe, after the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, sev-
eral countries have tried to implement the so called “Internal Stability Pact”, be-
tween the central and sub-national governments5. In 19996, a “Domestic Stability
Pact”(hereafter DSP), an euphemism for a central government law, was enacted
in Italy, which imposes ceilings for the annual increase in sub-national government
deficits (Balassone et al, 2002). However, the deficit referred to in the Pact did not
include health, capital, and interest spending, and overruns could be compensated
in subsequent years. Amendments of the 1999 act have retroactively permitted
larger deficits than originally foreseen.
Municipal governments were constrained to keep the growth of their fiscal gap
(defined as deficit, net of transfers and debt service) under tight control. The
punishment established for not complying with the DSP included the following
penalties: (i) 5 percent cut in the annual transfers from the central government; (ii)
ban on municipal hires; (iii) 30 percent cut on reimbursement and non-absenteeism
bonuses for the employees of the municipal administration. Cities complying with
the DSP, instead, took advantage from a reduction of the expenses on interests
for loans from the central government.
Gastaldi and Giurato (2009) procure a detailed review of the DSP regulation.
Table 1 summarizes the evolution of the Internal Pact over our sample period.
In 2001 this commitment was relaxed for municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants.
Till 2005 the only target of this policy was to put under tight control the growth
of municipal governments’ fiscal gap. The exact rule constraining the fiscal gap
changed from one year to another, but a structural turnaround went in 2005 when
5See Von Hagen for a discussion.
6See the Financial Law for 1999, art. 28 Law 448/1998.
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the target moved from the fiscal gap to the financial gap binding the expenditures
growth control7. For 2006, in addition, differentiation between current and capital
expenditure was required, the former to be contained and the latter augmented,
so as to improve the quality of local government spending. Through 2007 publi-
cation of the list of non-compliant entities was never envisaged, and the sanctions
were never applied. The main changes in 2007 involved a constraint on the final
budget balance and the definition of virtuous and non-virtuous administrations.
During this period there were a contradiction between the excessive rigidity in
the calculation of the budget objectives and the lack of punishment in the case of
non-compliance.
The awareness of this limit for 2009-2011 induced a sweeping change in the way
of determining the balance, described as mixed accrual basis, because it is defined
as the sum of the balance on an accrual basis for the current account and on a
cash basis for the capital account (net of the proceeds of credit collections and of
outlays for loans granted). Starting from 2009 also the monitoring system became
more severe. Particularly, the monitoring system became a constant presence; mu-
nicipalities were obliged to inform the Ministry of the Economy every six months
about the results achieved in terms of mixed competence and about the determi-
nation of the target. This rule is still in force. If this information is not provided,
the local government is considered non-compliant; in the case of delay, munici-
palities are not allowed to hire workers. Not compliers are subjected to binding
punishment also in terms of spending behavior and reduction of transfer from the
Ministry of the Economy. In this paper we use the 2009 change in the DSP regu-
lation as natural experiment in order to capture the backlashes of strengthening
the municipalities’ expenditure capability on local public procurement outcomes.
7See the Financial Law for 2005, art. 22 Law 311/2004, and Law 31 May 2005, n. 88, art.
1-ter.
Chapter 2. Local Government Spending and Public Procurement 36
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on a unique data-set of public procurement auc-
tions in Italy between 2002 and 2011, which was provided by Telemat Spa, an
information-provider leader in the Italian market for reselling information on pub-
lic contracts. Telemat collects data on all contracts procured by all Public Ad-
ministrations, on average 85,000 auctions by year.
The data-set contains auctions’ information on the following variables: contract-
ing authority and its location (city, province, region), type of the contract (works,
services, procurement of goods and healthcare procurement), date of publication
on Telemat website, date of the contract adjudication, reserve price of the auction
(the estimated value/reserve price set by the public administration), winning re-
bate (the winning bid, expressed as a percentage reduction from the of the starting
value), information about the winner. It also contains information about the an-
nouncement’s referential legislature, including the regulation’s article, cited in the
tender notice, from which we construct the variable on the adjudication method.
This database doesn’t offer information about the number of bidders. To recover
this missing information, we use an additional database collected by another Ital-
ian information-provider Infoplus Srl, that is a Telemat’s competitor. Finally, we
also have yearly information at the municipality level about the size of the resident
population (information merged by the 2001 ISTAT census).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the original cross-sectional database of
auctions for public works. The original database amounts to 371,522 auctions for
public works tendered by different Italian contracting authorities between 2002
and 2011. We have information about the contracting authorities and its location.
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The public administrations managing the auctions are mostly municipalities (62%
of the sample), then there is a 10% of provinces and only a 2.3% of regions. Other
public bodies or corporations (Universities, Hospitals, etc.) cover the residual 25%.
Public administrations are mostly located in the northern Italy (41%) splitted
between North East and North West, while 15.3% are in the Centre Italy, 28.8%
in the Southern Italy and 14.9% in the Islands. The average reserve price per
auction is 591,170 Euros, and the mean winning rebate is 19.5%.
Then we have informations about the type of public work object of the auction.
The majority of the public works concern the construction of roads (21.3%), fol-
lowed by the construction of public buildings, like schools and educational build-
ings (16.4%), Hydrics works (9.6%), art-related constructions (3%), for a large
number of auctions it is not well-defined the prevalent categhory (55.8%). This
is because many auctions are classified with more than one category and it is not
possible to trace the prevalent category of the work.
The average starting value per auction is 500,000 Euros. The average number of
bidders per auction is 36.6 and the mean winning rebate is 18.78%. The majority of
auctions for public works use the price method to adjudicate the auction (76.8%),
only 4.8% of the auctions in Telemat database are beauty contest contracts. We
have also retraced the application of authomatic exclusion method matching the
national regulation of public procurement system and information about the Law’s
article cited into the documentation included in Telemat database.
This paper is about the effect of the DSP on investment in public works and on
public procurement outcomes at municipality level. This motivation lead me to
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focus on a subsample of 178,187 auctions which have municipalities as contract-
ing authorities.8. From the original database we construct a balanced panel of
7,712 municipalities and ten years. The restructured database contains yearly in-
formation at municipality level on the following variables: total reserve price put
up for auctions of public works (it is the sum of single auctions reserve price for
that municipality in that year), total number of auctions, average winning rebate,
average reserve price per auction, resident population (fixed at census 2001 level)
and the average number of bidders. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the
final balanced panel of municipalities. On average italian municipalities have done
2.7 million of euros investments in public works per year during the period 2002-
2011. The average total number of auctions is around 6 auctions per year, so each
auction is about 400,000 Euros, in line with the information acquired from the
analysis of cross-sectional database.
The main variables of interest at municipality level are auction related outcomes.
To measure participation we evaluate the following measures: the probability of
winning an auction (Chance to Win), the probability of winning an auction for
the dominant firm in that municipality (Chance to Win - Dominant Firm) and
Average number of auctions won by each winner (Avg # Auctions per Winner).
Chance to Win at time t is calculated as the ratio between the number of auctions
and the number of bidders per municipality at time t. For each year the Chance
to Win for the Dominant Firm is the highest percentage of auctions assigned to
the same firm for each of the years in the sample and for each of municipality.
Finally, the Avg # Auctions per Winner represents the total number of auctions
adjudicated on average by each winner in each municipality. As regard auctions’
8The descriptive statistics in the subsample are similar to the full sample.
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outcomes: in mean winning rebates are around 17% and on average 39 bids are
received for each auction.
As regard the investment side, municipalities’ balance is mainly divided in cur-
rent expenditures and capital expenditures. Municipality have room for deciding
whether adjust current or capital spending. If there are no separate constraints on
the two types of expenditures, most municipalities have offset increase in public
spending by winding back public investment, reflecting the political reality that
it is easier to cut-back or postpone investment spending than it is to cut current
expenditures (see Oxley and Martin, 2001). Using total value and the number
of auctions to evaluate investments in public works, it is possible to investigate
how a combined constraint on current and capital expenditures impact decision of
public investment by local governments.
Table 3 shows that there are some systematic differences between municipalities
in the two groups. We observe that on average larger municipalities release more
calls for tenders than municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. Smaller municipali-
ties put up for auctions on average 890,000 Euros per year against municipalities
with above 5,0000 inhabitants that invest in public works on average 3.7 million of
Euros per year. The average amount of total reserve price put up for public works
auctions becomes less heterogeneous if we restrict the treatment sample to those
municipalities with inhabitants above 1,500 (in order to balance the number of
municipalities below and above the threshold). Auctions in municipalities below
5,000 inhabitants on average announce four auctions less than bigger municipali-
ties. However, variables related to auctions’ outcomes seem to be not so different
between the two groups. Municipalities in control group exhibit smaller winning
rebate (16.7% vs 17.9%), fewer bidders per auction (35 vs 41.6), similar probabil-
ity that a firm wins the auction (79.2% vs 76.5%) and average number of auctions
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per winner (1.62 vs 1.75). An interesting evidence is that in smaller municipalities
the dominant firm has an higher probability to win the auction (54% vs 35.1%).
This fact migth be due to: i) less firms participate to the auction because auc-
tions are smaller in value and this is linked to less advertisement (see Coviello and
Mariniello, 2011); ii) The next session explains how we explore the Italian munic-
ipalities spending to identify the effect of DSP on investment in public works and
its consequences on final price of the contract.
2.5 Difference-in-Differences Strategy
2.5.1 Setup and Identification
This section describes the empirical strategy used to identify the effect of being
subject to capital expenditure constraints on public procurement outcomes. In
Section 3.1, we discussed that the DSP is assigned to municipalities if an observed
covariate, the population, crosses a known threshold. Let Y 1it be the outcome for
municipality i in period t if municipality i is subjected to the DSP (the treatment).
The outcome for the same municipality if not exposed to the treatment is Y 0it .
Ideally one would employ random assignment to the DSP, assuring that treatment
is independent of Y 0it and Y
1
it and the factors influencing them. Indicating the
dummy for treated municipalities by dspi, it is not independent of factors influ-
encing Yit. Municipalities in the treatment may differ from municipalities out-of
the treatment in many ways, including the effect of the DSP, so the simple dif-
ference in outcomes between treated and control municipalities need not identify
DSP impact for any definable group.
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As discussed in the previous session, the identification strategy compares munic-
ipalities below 5,000 inhabitants with municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants and
these groups are very different in term of investment behavior. Implementing a
simple Difference-in-Differences (D-i-D) analysis with fixed effects at municipal-
ity level is optimal in this framework. Indeed, this strategy allows to exploit
the DSP impact by comparing the average change in the outcomes within mu-
nicipalities above 5,000 inhabitants with the average change within municipalities
below 5,000 inhabitants. This identification method thus differences out business
cycle effects which are common to both small and large municipalities. Any sys-
tematic difference in the small municipalities and large municipalities averages is
attributed to the only known difference between the local governments, different
in matter of DSP regulation. One thus needs to ensure that there are no other
differences between the two set of municipalities that could account for the differ-
ent investment patterns. Aside from the other policy regarding the mayors’ salary,
discussed in the Introduction, there are no other administrative reasons of which
we are mindful.
Let postt be a dummy for the period after the change in DSP regulation (2009-
2011). The impact of the policy for municipality i is (Y 1it − Y
0
it ). The average
treatment effect for those municipalities undergoing the DSP regulation is E(Y 1it −
Y 0it |dspi = 1). It is clear that these are potential outcomes, in practice we only
observe one or the other. For example, we see Y 1it in municipalities above 5,000
inhabitants in period t = 1, but we don’t observe Y 0it . Therefore, the outcome for
a generic municipality i is:
Yit = (1− dspit)Y
0
it + dspitY
1
it (2.1)
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The first assumption of the D-i-D methodology is an additive structure for poten-
tial outcomes in the no-treatment state, specifically we assume that investment
in public works depends on the sum of a time-invariant municipality effect and a
temporal effect that is common between municipalities
E(Y 0it |i, t) = µi + λt (2.2)
where i denotes municipality and t denotes period (before or after the treatment).
Assuming that E(Y 1it − E(Y
0
it |i, t) is a constant, denoted β0, I estimate D-i-D (or,
more generally fixed effects) models of the form:
Yit = α + β0dspi + β1postt + β2dsp ∗ postit ++µi + λt + ξit (2.3)
with E(ξit|i, t) = 0. Then postt = 0 if the period is before of equal to 2008
and postt = 1 if the year is post 2008; the dummy for treatment dspi = 0 if the
municipality i is below 5,000 inhabitants and dspi = 1 if the municipality i is above
5,000 inhabitants; β2 is the causal effect of interest. This model includes two main
effects for municipalities and year: µi is the municipality-specific term and λt is the
yearly fixed-effect. The causal effect is caught by the coefficient of the interaction
term that indicates DSP municipalities after the policy implementation.
Because empirical analysis demonstrate that pervasive serial correlation in D-i-
D models at municipality level may produce severely downward biased standard
errors (see Bertrand,Duflo and Mullainathan, 2001; Donald and Lang, 2001), we
use Huber-White standard errors clustered at the municipality level throughout.
These SEs are robust to arbitrary forms of error correlation within a municipality.
Of course, the model include µi as the municipality-specific term from the mean
δ0 and λt is the yearly fixed-effect. From here we get the causal effect of interest
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β2 that is the population double difference
β2 = {E(Yit|dspi = 0, postt = 1)− E(Yit|dspi = 0, postt = 0)}+
− {E(Yit|dspi = 1, postt = 1)− E(Yit|dspi = 1, postt = 0)}
Table 4 shows the average total starting value put up for auctions in public works
at municipalities below and above 5,000 inhabitants, before and after the change in
DSP regulation. The causal effect of interest, estimated using the sample analogue
of the population mean, is negative and around 566,000 Euros.
The key identification assumption of the DD strategy is that, nevertheless differ-
ences in level, trends in outcomes would be the same in both groups in the absence
of treatment that is the well known common trend assumption. In the following
sub-sessions we provide both graphical and parametric tests for this assumption
and evidences support the reliability of the common trend assumption.
2.5.2 Testing for D-i-D assumptions
Common trend assumption. First we investigate graphically the validity of the
common trend assumption. An interesting starting point for the empirical evalua-
tion is to look at the relation in trends between outcomes in municipalities below
5,000 inhabitants and municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants. Figures 2, 3, 4 and
5 show the path of four variables in the two groups of municipalities. Figure 1
shows the trend in average total starting value put up for auctions in municipalities
exposed to DSP discipline (red line) and municipalities without DSP constraints
(blue line). Not surprisingly, the total spending for public work is very different in
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level between the two groups of municipalities. The figure shows that before 2008,
even though very different in levels, the average total value of yearly investment
in public works is rather stable for both groups (around 2 millions for spending
constrained municipalities and around 300,000 euros in municipalities below 5,000
inhabitants). The change in DSP regulation in 2009 in associated to a strong
reduction in the value of investments in the affected municipalities. At the same
time, figure 3 shows that over the same period also the number of auctions for
public works in municipalities with DSP constraints decreased more than in un-
affected municipalities. This evidence suggest that on average the size of public
works contract remained unchanged.
Over the same period figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of average winning rebates
and number of bidders in the two types of municipalities. a stronger increase in
winning rebates and number of bidders in DSP municipalities. The figure demon-
strates two interesting points: the parallel and increasing path of winning rebates
in both groups is associated to the same path in the number of bidders; it is not
clear whether or not there is a significant difference in the rise after 2008 between
spending constrained municipalities and no spending constraint municipalities.
The mean impact of the change in DSP regulation turns out to be negative on in-
vestments in procurement auctions (less auctions in value and volume) but positive
on competition (increase in the number of bidders) and public spending (higher
winning rebate that means lower price for the municipality). Finally, the graphical
inspection suggests the validity of the common trend assumption.
Exogeneity of the Treatment. In applying the D-i-D framework to the data, it
is important to consider carefully the exogenous nature of the “experiment” cre-
ated by the change in DSP regulation. In the ideal case, the rules would be
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independent, random events that varied in timing and had no spillover effects to
non-adopting municipalities. If so, equation (3), if correctly specied, will provide
an unbiased estimate of the average “treatment” effect, β2. The present analysis
does not differ from the ideal case. The DSP rules are fixed by the central govern-
ment level because a super-national objective, relative to the European Stability
Pact. Therefore, the constraints imposed with the DSP can be viewed as inde-
pendent and random events. Specifically we graphically inspect the hypothesis of
the treatment exogeneity, to exclude self-selection in the treatment. Borrowing
a graphical method from the RDD environment (see McCrary, 2008), we exclude
the manipulation of the “running variable” from municipalities above but very
near to 5,000. The top panel of figure 6 shows that the overall distribution of the
municipalities’ population is right skewed and has no significant mass probability
around the threshold. The bottom figure implements the graphical version of the
McCrary (2008) density test in the subsample of municipalities around the dis-
continuity threshold.9 This figure suggests that there are no graphical differences
(jump) between the two separate estimates of the density around the threshold.
Finally we find no statistical evidence of jumps in the density around the threshold
of 5,000 inhabitants.
These graphical and parametric tests show that the D-i-D assumptions are sat-
isfied. Therefore, we can assume parallel trends in outcome variables before the
change in the DSP that is quasi-experimentally assigned around the threshold.
9This test is constructed in two steps. First, we obtain a very under-smoothed histogram of
the population distribution, where the bins of the histogram are defined so that no one histogram
bin includes both points to the left and right of the discontinuity point. Second, we run a local
linear smoothing of the histogram, where we treat the midpoints of the histogram bins as a
regressor, and the normalized counts of the number of observations of the bins are the outcome
variable.
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2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 The Effect of DSP on Local Investment in Public
Works
Table 5 contains the main D-i-D point estimates of equation (3) and standard
errors of the DSP effect on investment in public works by Italian municipalities.
Each column presents the results of seven regressions. For each outcome variable,
column 1 contains the standard D-i-D coefficients; column 2 presents D-i-D with
fixed-effects at municipalities level, in column 3 I add also temporal fixed-effects.
Although the central objective of this analysis is to test coefficient signs, their
magnitude has relevant policy implications. The baseline estimates are an average
treatment on the treated (ATT), which is of interest given the economic relevance
of the municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants. This ATT might differ from the
average treatment effect (ATE) because treated municipalities might differ from
smaller municipalities in terms of the outcomes in the absence of the DSP. By
restricting the set of treated municipalities to those in the neighborhood of 5,000
inhabitants, it would be possible to evaluate the estimates as an ATE for these PAs
and to compare this ATE with the previously found ATT. Section 6.3 addresses
this issue and presents the D-i-D results for three different restricted sample of
municipalities.
The impact of the change in DSP rules on investment in public works is significant
both in statistical and in economic terms. The results are similar across the three
model specifications. The estimates indicate that municipalities subjected to the
DSP, after the change in the regulation, on average lower total investment in public
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works (both in value and in volume). The full set of D-i-D estimates also show
that all municipalities over this period dedicate less resources to investment in
public works10.
The coefficient of -12.4 in column 3 indicates that after removing municipalities
fixed effects and common year effects, investment in public works decreased by
approximately 1.2 millions of Euro in municipalities affected by the DSP exception
than in non-affected municipalities. The coefficient of -2.673 in column 3 indicates
that investment in public works not only decrease in value, but also in volume
(this excludes the possibility that the size of auctions is changed). Municipalities
subject to the DSP reduced the average number of auctions by approximately
three after the change in regulation. These correspond to a decrease in the total
starting value by 47% and a reduction in the number of auctions by 44%.
2.6.2 The effects of the DSP on Participation and Winning
Rebate
As expected, estimates in Table 5 indicate that the DSP regulation leads to an
average increase in the number of bidders per auction by 16% (+6 bidders with
respect to the sample average of 39 bidders) and a lower final price, with an
increase in the winning rebate by 5.5% (+0.959 relative to a sample average of
17.45%). This suggests that an increase in the number of bidders, caused by the
DSP and related to a decrease in investment for public works, should encourage
10Complete set of estimates for each outcome is available upon request.
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more aggressive bidding, suggesting a potential saving at time of the auction of
about 290 thousands euros per year, almost 41 thousands euros per auction11.
Groups from 3 to 5 in table 5 report the D-i-D estimates of the effect of DSP
respectively on the probability to win an auction for a generic firm, the probability
of winning an auction for the dominant firm in the municipalities (the firm that
have won the highest number of auctions in that year) and the average number of
auctions won by each winner. The estimates indicate that a decrease in investment
for public works from municipalities subject to DSP leads to an average decrease
of 2.9% in the probability of winning an auction, and an average increase in the
probability of winning an auction for the dominant firm of 4.8%. These correspond
to a decrease in the chance to win an auction by 3.8% and the same probability
for the stronger firm by 11%. Both effects are statistically different from zero
respectively at a 1% and a 5% significance level. Instead, the effect on the average
number of auctions won by each winner is not statistically significant.
To sum up, these results show that DSP really impact the decision of local gov-
ernment to undertake new projects for public works. Indeed, the previous results
show that municipalities affected by the DSP lower total starting value and to-
tal number of auctions. At the same time those municipalities experience higher
winning rebates as well as higher number of bidders per auction; those bidders
have lower chance to win the auction but the dominant firm has higher chance to
adjudicate the auction.
11Table 5 shows that on average municipalities under DSP constraints announce auctions for
2.6 million of euros per year distributed over 7 auctions, this means that the mean value of
each auction is around 371,428 euros. On average the adjudication price is the starting value
put up for auctions net of the percentage rebate offered by the winner. The average winning
rebate per auction is 17.5%, this means that on average the final price for the PA is 371,428*(1-
0.175)=306,428 euros. The potential saving induced to the reduction in price (increase in winning
rebate) is the difference between 306,428 euros and the final price calculated taking into account
the lower winning rebate (16.6%): 371,428*(1-0.166)=264,735. On average the saving is about
41 thousands euros.
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2.7 Extensions
2.7.1 The effects of the DSP on FPAs and ABAs
As discussed in section 3, PAs may announce auctions for public works choos-
ing among several types of adjudication procedures. When an open procedure
is launched, the auction’s announcement informs potential participants about the
format of the auction. In Italy contracts for public works can typically be procured
through auctions based only on price. Table 1 shows that between 2002 and 2011
these auctions accounted for 76% of auctions of all procedures used in Telemat
database. In this paper we only consider these type of auctions, disregarding other
methods like beauty contest (“offerta economicamente piu´ vantaggiosa”).
In general, auctions for public works are common-value auctions in which an in-
crease in the number of bidders has two counteracting effects on equilibrium bid-
ding behavior: i) the competitive effect; ii) the winner’s curse effect. The first
effect predicts that increasing competition leads to more aggressive bidding, as
each potential bidder tries to maximize her chances of winning against more ri-
vals. The second effect forecast that rational bidders will bid less aggressively in
response to an increase in competition. These predictions have strong implications
in terms of policy because when the winner’s curse is large enough to compensate
the competitive effect, governments should restrict entry, or favor negotiations over
auctions (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996; Hong and Shum, 2002). However, these
effects stand under the classical assumption that bidders are able to commit to
bidding promises, that is the not the case of concession contracts (Guasch et al.,
2003). Procurement contracts for public works with price adjudication method
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also allow renegotiations. Indeed renegotiations are partially subject to the dis-
cretion of the public administrators and can be used without particularly strong
restrictions.
When the adjudication of the auction is based only on price, following the regu-
lation in force, PAs choose between two different mechanism to select the winner:
first price (FP) or average bid (AB). These mechanism are described in detail in
section 3. Here is useful for the analysis to restate that they differ in the way the
winner is determined. In a FPA the highest “responsible” rebate always wins the
auction. In an ABA the highest rebate will never win the auction because it is
automatically excluded from the selection (see figure 1). Decarolis (2012) shows:
i) that FPAs induce lower adjudication price than ABAs but also lower quality and
higher cost in the future (high probability of renegotiation); ii) that the specific
features of the AB mechanism deliver the theoretical possibility that increasing the
number of bidders in the auction not necessarily results in greater competition. If
so an increase in the number of bidders will not be associated to an increase in the
winning discount. We test empirically these theoretical predictions, implementing
a D-i-D both for FPAs and ABAs, separately.
Table 9 and 10 present distinct D-i-D estimates for FPAs and ABAs12. The es-
timates show different results for the two types of adjudication methods. They
indicate that DSP causes a decrease in investments for public works whether with
FP or with AB procedure, respectively by around 721,000 euros and 2.2 millions
euros. Panels 6 and 7 in both tables report the effect of the DSP (and the lower
12From the original cross-section of auctions we build two separate datasets: one with only
FPAs and the other with only ABAs. With these two new set of auctions, we proceed with
the construction of two balanced panel databases of municipalities. We run separately all the
regressions using these two datasets.
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level of investments) on the winning rebate and the number of bidders, respec-
tively. They provide different economic evidences about the effect of increasing
competition in the two types of procedures. The results suggest sure enough a
negative and statistically signicant relation between the level of investments in
auctions for public works and the winning rebate only in FPAs (+1.274 percent-
age points, with a standard error of 0.646) but estimates are not economically and
statistically significant when we consider ABAs (the coefficient for the winning
rebate is negative and not statistically significant).
These results show that the winners curse effect is particularly strong in ABAs.
More precisely, the winners curse effect prevails on the competitive effect so that
bidders bid less aggressively when they expect more competition in ABAs. This is
somehow related to the specific “collusive” feature of the ABAs (see Conley and
Decarolis, 2012). In line with Athias and Nun˜ez (2008) we also observe that the
effect of the winners curse is weaker for FPAs, where the likelihood of renegotiation
is higher, so that bidders will bid more strategically in weaker institutional frame-
works. We conclude that more competition induced by a reduction in demand for
public work by local governments induce “really high competition” in the form of
higher rebates only in FPAs.
Table 6, 7, 8 report several regression results to test the common trend assump-
tion. Following Autor (2003), Table 6 provides estimates of a subset of the model
in table 5, augmented with leads and lags of the implied DSP regulation. Specifi-
cally I add indicator variables for four years before adoption and three years after
adoption. These indicator variables are equal to 1 in the corresponding years if
the municipality is eligible for the DSP. There is no evidence of an anticipatory
response within municipalities as regard variables in column (3)-(6). The evidence
of no anticipatory effect is unclear for the first two column. To further investigate
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the validity of common trend assumption We run a so-called placebo experiment
only using the pre-reform perios of the data and moving the DSP shock from 2009
to 2005. Table 7 report the result of the “placebo” regression. The coefficients are
all close to zero and all not statistically significant, except the variable “number
of auctions”. These estimates makes it particularly unlikely that differential time
trends explain my results. Again a simple test for “parallel linear trends“suggest
that differential trend are not a threat to validity of our findings.
2.7.2 Robustness Check
In this section we present several robustness checks for the D-i-D estimates. First
we restrict sample of municipalities around the threshold of 5,000. One concern
with the D-i-D approach is that the relationship between the DSP eligibility and
the level of investments may be due to the model specification, sample selection,
or the omission of the relevant characteristics of public procurement auctions.
The primary estimates are obtained by considering a model that includes the
municipalities fixed effects and the year effects over the entire sample of Italian
municipalities. This specification may not be sufficiently flexible to absorb all the
auctions characteristics. In the previous section we investigated heterogeneous
effects of DSP on FPAs and ABAs with this motivation. Now we present additional
checks based on the definition of different treatment and control groups. Table
11, 12 and 13 report different sets of estimates of the effect of DSP on auctions’
outcomes using three restricted sample of municipalities.
Table 11 shows D-i-D estimates using as control group only municipalities above
1,500 inhabitants. This choice is motivated by the decision to balance the number
of municipalities below and above the threshold of 5,000 inhabitants. This is
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also useful to avoid possible overlapping with other potential policy changes. The
estimation window is reduced to 14,254 observations but the signs of the estimates
remain unchanged with respect to the basic model. The effect of the DSP is
economic and statistically significant on the level of investment (both in value and
in volume) with the negative sign.
Table 12 and 13 report results for two different additional intervals. The first set
of regressions (table 12) is run on a restricted sample of municipalities, those in
[2,517-32,154] inhabitants. These extremes of this interval are respectively the
population mean value in the two original control an treatment groups. Again
estimates show significant effect of the reduction on investments due to the DSP,
with a coefficient negative but lower that the correspondent coefficient resulting
from the basic D-i-D model. Also within this bracket the effect on winning rebate
and number of bidders is positive and statistically significant (winning rebate
+0.97% and +6.3 bidders on average).
The second group of regressions (table 13) report results for a still restricted sub-
sample of municipalities, those in [2,444-13,620] inhabitants. This bracket is chosen
using as lower bound the median of the population in the control group and as
upper bound the median of the population in the treatment group. For this group
of municipalities the results suggest that the DSP doesn’t play a significant role in
reducing investment in public works. The interesting evidence is that as the effect
on the level of spending in public works vanish also the effect on the winning rebate
disappear. The signs of the coefficients are all those expected but the estimates are
not statistically significant. The lack of evidence for municipalities very close to the
threshold is not in contrast with previous result. It is reasonable that small DSP
municipalities, those above the threshold but very close to 5,000 inhabitants, don’t
take into account the constraints imposed by the DSP in planning public works ,
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and decide to incur in late payments as long as they provide auctions to firms (more
likely local firms). A second explanation is simply that smaller municipalities: i)
are also those identified as the less compliant with domestic stability pact rules;
ii) are more efficient in reducing current spending and they don’t resort to capital
expenditure cutting. We conclude that it is extremely important to talk out the
heterogeneous behavior between municipalities relative to the rules imposed by the
DSP, in light to the new regulation in force from January 2013 that expend the
pact also to municipalities below 5,000 but above 1,000 inhabitants. At present
the lack of data on the late in payments at municipality level make this exercise
not possible. Therefore results presented in this section are twofold important: i)
they confirm the negative effect of DSP on investment in public works and the
positive effect of the DSP on final price of the contract; ii) they shine a light on
the potential trade-off between reduction in investment in public works and delays
in payment.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
This paper focus on the identification of the underlying causes of the drop in
capital spending in Italy over the last ten years and investigate the effect of the
reduction in level of investments for public works on auctions’ outcomes. It can
be summarized that from the empirical research conducted, it was found that the
change in DSP regulation after 2008 significantly reduced level of investment in
public works by italian municipalities. Municipalities eligible for the DSP were
allowed to autonomously decide how manipulate current and capital spending in
order to respect the expenditure constraint in term of “mixed competence”. The
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results suggest that between 2009 and 2011 on average municipalities affected by
the DSP reduced investment in public works by 1.2 millions of Euro.
We also identify the effects of reduction in investments for public works on auc-
tions’ outcomes by comparing municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants with mu-
nicipalities above 5,000 inhabitants and taking into account the auction format
(FP vs AB). Consistently with Athias and Nun˜ez we provide evidence that the
competition induced by a lower level of investments affects rebates only in FPAs.
In terms of policy implication this result suggest that government should induce
firms to participate FPAs, in order to increase entry.
Reduction in capital expenditures is not associated with reduction in current ex-
penditures by Italian municipalities. Particularly, when local governments have
the possibility of choice it is more likely that they restraint capital expenditure.
This is crucial for the debate on the containment of public spending. In this sense,
our findings shed light on the negative effect of a mix competence method to define
spending cap on capital expenditure side.
Chapter 3
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3.1 Introduction
There is little doubt that the process of new firm formation is a crucial factor
for economic growth. This is an embedded question in economics, first identified
by Shumpeter (1911, 1942) and formalized by Aghion and Howitt (1992)1. How-
ever, while a large body of literature has explored the key determinants of new
firm formation, the heterogeneous results they have produced have contributed to
not achieving a coherent explanation of this process. What does appear clear is
that new firm formation dynamics are very complex and in large part difficult to
measure because a lack of comparable data.
In this paper we focus on the effect of local investment in public works on new
firm formation. Particularly we look at the entry dynamics for construction firms,
who are those participating in auctions for public works, exploiting aggregate
data on firms entry and exit at municipality level. Analysis is based on data on
registrations, de-registrations and the stock of firms taken from the Chamber of
Commerce Firms Register, monitored by Unioncamere. After further developing
this database by adding measures of investment in public works, we use the vari-
ation in the so called “Domestic Stability Pact” (DSP) regulation as instrument
for capital expenditures by local entities.
The positive relationship between investment in public works measured by the
average total starting value and new firm entry rate is documented in Figure
3. The right panel shows the relationship between the average value of auctions
for public works and the average entry rate of construction firms by year. For
1A large body of literature has addressed this issue, see, for example, Wennekers and Thurik
(1999), Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), OECD (2003), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), Commis-
sion of the European Communities (2003, 2010), Alesina et al. (2005), Reynolds et al. (2005),
and the contributions in Audretsch, Grilo, and Thurik (2007), Griffith et al. (2007), Aghion et
al. (2009) and Leitao and Baptista (2009).
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comparison the left panel shows the same relationship existing for all firms. We
would like to investigate also the de-registration process and make it comparable
to the registration data, however figure 3 shows that the relationship between
average total starting value and exit rate is much less clear than those existing
between average total starting value and entry rate.
Figure 3 suggests that total starting value is a strong predictor of entry rate. It
is not certain, however, whether this correlation corresponds to a causal relation-
ship. Obtaining evidence on the causal effect of investment in public works is
difficult because several reasons. First of all, biases are caused by omitted vari-
ables which are correlated with both auction starting value and entry rate. One
potential omitted factor is the quality of municipality’s administration which is
difficult to measure. “Better” administrators are able to better manage local en-
tity’s balance and expenditures. “Better” administrators are also more efficient
in having confrontation with firms and make them easier to participate to the
auction. It is reasonable that bigger and better structured companies have the
possibility to choose unconditionally were to bid, without geographic and quali-
fication restrictions. The selection problem also arises and biases OLS estimates
of the local capital investment. Conventional OLS estimates will therefore lead to
bias estimates of the effect of capital expenditure on firm dynamics.
To address these problems, we propose the change in DSP rules as a source of
exogenous variation in investment for public works. Our framework is Italy, where
in 2009 fiscal and balance rules for local entities experienced substantial changes
with respect to the previous period. In 1999 central government introduced a
set of fiscal rules as response to the European Stability and Growth Pact. The
DSP is aimed at ensuring that Local Government sector contribute to pursue an
overall balance of public finance. The main feature of the Italian DSP is its yearly
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revision which creates no few problems for the local planning. Since 2002 the
budget constraint was diversified between regions and municipalities, in particular
municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants were excluded from compliance2.
The 2009-2011 version of the DSP represents a crucial experience for local entities
because of its several news. This shock regarded only municipalities affected by the
DSP, those above 5,000 inhabitants. Using this change in regulation as instrument
for the level of public capital spending , we investigate how the sharp (and we
claim exogenous) drop in auctions for public works affected new firm formation
and other aggregate firm dynamics. Figure 1 shows the trend in total starting value
of auctions for public works between 2002 and 2011. Our empirical strategy tends
to investigate the impact of this drop in the total value of investment after 2008
to the formation of new firms in Italy. The paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides an overview of our research setting giving a brief description of the the
relationship between investment in public works (as a proxy for infrastructures)
and dynamic of firms. Section 3 summarizes the relevant literature. Section 4
describes the data sources in more detail. Key identification assumptions and
empirical strategy are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 presents and interprets
the empirical results and validity tests. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude offering
policy implications of our findings and suggestions for future research.
3.2 Infrastructures and Construction Firms
The macroeconomic relationship between public infrastructures investment and
local GDP is at the core of discussion in literature.
2According to the Law n. 228/2012, since January 2013 also municipalities below 5,000 but
above 1,000 inhabitants are eligible for the DSP.
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The first question linked to the “local infrastructure endowment” is related to
the correlation between infrastructures creation and short/long term productivity.
The seminal paper in this research line is the one of Fernald (1999) exploring the
interpretation of the existing correlation between infrastructures and productivity
in U.S. industries from 1953 to 1989. In his work the author asked for a causal
interpretation of this association, focusing on the impact of changes in roads on
the relative productivity performance of U.S industries. The main result of his
investigation is that “changes in road growth are associated with larger changes in
productivity growth in industries that are more vehicle intensive”. The important
conclusion of these findings is that there exist a causal effect of the change in the
roads stock on the change in productivity.
The second crucial point is the one related to the strategic role played by en-
trepreneurship for the local economies’ development. This issue is enhanced by
both policy measures and academic research (Garc´ıa, A. B., 2013). The need
for more competitive and dynamic firms was supported by the Lisbon Agenda
(Lisbon Council, 2000) and more recently by the Small Business Act, drafted in
2008 from the European Commission. The Act stands for the extensive interest
of policy-makers in throwing light on entrepreneurship processes. It consists in
ten principles seeking to “improve the overall policy approach to entrepreneurship
and to promote small and medium enterprise (SME) growth”(European Commis-
sion, 2008). At the same time recent research is focusing on the factors that may
stimulate entrepreneurial activity with particular attention on the geographical
dimension.
From figure 2 is clear the sharp decrease in the average entry rate after 2008 and
the motivation for our research question. Our goal is to investigate the specific
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role of local government spending in public works on the dramatic reduction in
new firm formation in the Italian context.
3.3 Literature Review
This paper relates to the literature that has analyzed the determinants of new firm
formation. While a number of empirical studies have attended to explain which
factors are crucial for new firm creation, they have reached mixed conclusions.
One of the main difficulty in approaching the question of new firm formation is
the heterogeneous of available data that lead to contradictory results. In the
literature we can distinguish purely cross-country studies3 (Da Rin et al., 2011
and Kneller and McGowan, 2011) from analyses at regional (Reynolds et al., 1995
and Audretch and Fritsch, 2002) and city level (Rosenthal and Ross (2010), Doms
et al. (2010), Belitski and Korosteleva 2010). These studies support the idea that
new firm formation decision is not an isolated event but it is supported by the
environment in which entrepreneur will operate.
Previous literature has analyzed the effect of many factors as determinants of new
firm creation. Guesnier (1994), Reynolds (1994), Armington and Acs (2002), Au-
dretch and Fritsch (1994) and Garofoli (1994) has analyzed the effect of population
change on new firm entry, founding either positive or zero effect. As regard the
role of mean establishment size (MES), while Audretch and Fritsch (1994) found
no significant effect on new firm formation, Armington and Acs (2002) indicated a
3There is a large body of recent literature of purely cross-country studies that study the
effect of policy measures and country characteristics on the incorporation decision and on the
characteristics of entrants, particularly the study by Djankov et al. (2010) analyzes a cross-
section of 85 countries using survey-based information. See also Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007),
Demirgu¨c¸-Kuntetal et al. (2006), Desai et al. (2003), Djankov et al. (2002), Klapper et al.
(2006), Perotti and Volpin(2007).
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negative effect. Again there is uncertainty about the net effect of unemployment
on the rate of new firm formation (Reynolds et al., 1994).
Because of our focus on local capital spending, our paper is more in line with
several recent papers that have used variations in government spending to identify
the effects of fiscal policy (Acconcia et al, 2013, Fishback and Kachanovskaya,
2010 or Wilson, 2012) in particular on firms dynamics.
Local government spending may have opposite influences on new firm creation.
Hick and Sutaria, 2004 find no significant effect at regional level of the change
in local spending on new entry rate. In their paper they argue that an increase
in local spending may have a positive demand-pull effect, when local governments
design spending for local physical and infrastructure improvements, and a negative
tax-push effect, as higher spending is associated to higher income. Our empirical
investigation shed lights on the impact of total local capital expenditures on new
firm formation. Therefore, we contribute to the empirical literature by looking at
a policy tool that has affected total government spending and its composition. We
directly focus on the effect of capital spending reduction in public works on new
firm formation at municipality level.
To our knowledge this paper is the first to investigate the causal effect of local
investment in public works on new firm creation at municipality level. The existing
literature on new firm formation has indeed mostly focused upon endogenous issues
analyzing the determinants of business creation as a measure of entrepreneurship.
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3.4 Data
We use two sources of data to construct a balanced panel dataset of municipalities
between 2002 and 2011. The main source of data is the Unioncamere4 database
which contains aggregate information at municipality level about the number of
firms yearly registered, active, new born and canceled from the “Official Firms’
Register” 5.
The data were originally an unbalanced panel of 8,069 Italian municipalities be-
tween 2000 and 2012 and also procured disaggregated informations by firm sector
and size6. We define four outcome variables for firm dynamics. According to the
ecological approach, we define the variable entry rate as the fraction of new firms
to the number of firms previously in existence and active in the market7. Following
the same approach we define the variable exit rate as the fraction of canceled firms
to to the number of firms previously in existence and active in the market.
4Unioncamere is an association of public Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and
Crafts present in Italy at regional level. Its objective is to consolidate policies and best actions
that support the development of companies that operate in the region, so as to intensify specific
regions’ economic leadership in Italy and in Europe. The Chambers of Commerce, Industry,
Crafts and Agriculture are independent institutions that, in their province of competence, sup-
port and promote activities for the general interest of enterprises. They support the development
of local economies, especially with regard to the system of small and medium-sized firms.
5There is a distinction between “registered firm” and “active firm”. We refer to a firm as
“registered” if it is in the Firm Archive and it is not liquidated, irrespective of its activity position
(active, inactive, suspended, in liquidation or failed). According to the Unioncamere database
definition, a firm is defined as “active” if it operative and it has no any ongoing insolvency
procedures.
6Firms are classified according to the ATECO 2007 code. This is an automatic coding tool
which makes possible to assign an ATECO 2007 code according to a brief description of the
economic activity supplied by the firm. We have fifteen activity’s sectors in our database: Agri-
culture, Mineral Processing, Manufacturing, Electricity, Construction, Trade, Room and Board
Services, Transport and Storage Services, Finance and Insurance, Public Administration and
Social Insurance, Education, Health-Care and Social Services, Family activities, Other Organi-
zations, Not Classified.
7See Hicks and Sutaria (2004) for a detailed illustration of the two different approaches
widespread in literature to measure new firm formation.
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We also construct two measures of firm turnover. The first is the difference between
exit rate and entry rate indicating the number of firms yearly deleted from the
Register with respect to the number of new firms, standardized to the number of
enterprises previously in existence and active in the municipality. To explore the
relationship between exit and entry we introduce the second outcome that is the
ratio between exit rate and entry rate. This is something new in the literature
to measure firms’ turnover. This indicator is one if there is perfect equilibrium
between new firms and canceled firms, it is positive if the number of canceled firms
exceeds the number of new firms.
We combine the data on aggregate firm dynamics with information on investment
in public works measured by the total starting value of auctions announced by
municipalities. The combination of this two databases produces a balanced panel
of 7,712 municipalities between 2002 and 2011. The natural feature of our em-
pirical methodology induce us to rearrange the data in order to exclude missing
values for variables included in the regression. This leaves us with a final sample
of 18,092 observations.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample of municipalities. The main
variable of interest are the Total Starting Value and the Entry Rate. From the
descriptives we see that the average total value of investment in public works by
Italian municipalities is about 2.5 million of Euros, but with a high dispersion.
In our sample about 50% of the municipalities invest on average only about 1
million. These amount put up for auctions is on average distributed among 6
auctions,therefore the average value of each auction is around 430 thousands Euros.
The ratio Exit/Entry represents a proxy for the turnover rate of firms. It is on
average 1 for the whole of firms, a little higher for construction firms. This indicates
an “equilibrium”between entry rate and exit rate in the long-run. Again the second
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turnover indicator is worse for the construction sector than for all the remaining
industries (-1.69 vs -0.52). These variables signal that on average for construction
firms the frequency of de-registered firms is higher than the frequency of new firm
registration. Our analysis is aimed to understand if public spending austerity may
shrink new entry formation and the findings regarding construction firms display
a negative impact compared with an already critical sector situation. Exit Rate is
higher for construction firms than for all other sectors (7.33% vs 7.09%) meaning
that on average 7.3% of the registered firms die during the later year. Also average
Entry Rate is higher for construction firms than for all other sectors (9.02% vs
7.61%). We also report descriptive statistics relative to the auctions’ features.
Since our goal is to individuate the role of local public spending in pushing the
formation of new firms and its responsibility in causing the cancellation from the
Firms’ Register, we don’t need to exclude from our analysis any auction based
on its size. The main analysis is conducted on the entire sample of municipali-
ties. Thanks to our empirical strategy we are able to control for fixed structural
differences, no matter how big they are, among municipalities. The next section
presents our identification strategy and empirical model.
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3.5 Identification
Using this dataset we investigate the effect of investment in public works on firm
dynamics outcomes at municipality level with the following regression model:
Outcomeit = β1 + β2(TotalStartingV alue)it + β3(AnomalyExclusion)it+
β4(Avg#AuctionsPerWinner)it + β5(ProbLocalWinner)it+
β6MunicipalityFEi + β7Y earFEt + ǫit
(3.1)
We are primarily interested in evaluating the relation between the level of invest-
ment in public works and new firm formation at municipality level. We regress
the outcome of municipality i in term of aggregate firm dynamics in year t on a
measure of investment level, total starting value of auctions for public works an-
nounced by municipality and other controls. The main controls are auction-based
variables. Anomaly Exclusion is a continuous variable between zero and one and
it is and indicator for contracting authorities “preferences” between adjudication
methods available to select the winner. This variable indicates the percentage of
auctions adjudicated with the AB method in municipality i at time t. We also
control for the average number of auctions won by the same winner (in a sense
this is an index of winners’ turnover in the municipality) and for the probability of
winning for a local firm (defined as a firm located in the same city of the contract-
ing authority). To control for temporal factors common between municipalities
we include year dummies. We also control for municipality level factors which
affect firm dynamics outcomes and are constant over time by including a full set
of municipality fixed effects.
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The main coefficient of interest is β2 indicating how level of investment in public
works affects firm dynamics outcomes at municipality level. However, estimating
this equation using OLS will go into biased results, as the amount put up for public
works auction is endogenous. Three cases may deliver biased estimates: measure-
ment errors, omitted variables and selection of interested firms into municipalities
that announce more auctions. Measurement errors occurs because total starting
value of the auction is reported by hand from the announcement and also because
the effective price payed by the contracting authority is affected by ex-post event
as renegotiations.
In order to take into account these concerns we propose the DSP regulation af-
ter the change in rules to limit local public spending as an exogenous source of
variation in investments in public works. As discussed before, the DSP contraints
interest only municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants while municipalities below
5,000 inhabitants were not affected. After 2008, municipalities under DSP reg-
ulation experienced a substantial change in the procedure to calculate the cap
for local expenditures. For each local government the specific balance target is
calculated using the criterion of mixed accrual basis (without any differentiation
between current and capital expenditure caps).
Figure 3 shows how the DSP affected investment in public works by italian munic-
ipalities. The red line shows municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants, subject to the
DSP regulation. The blue line shows municipalities without DSP constraints. We
note that the change in DSP rules caused a strong reduction in the level of total
investment in public works in affected municipalities. It is important to stress that
the fact that DSP affect bigger and systematically different municipalities does not
invalidate the identification strategy because we will take into account level effects
introducing municipalities fixed effects. The crucial assumption for the validity of
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the Difference-in-Differences approach is that the trends in control and treatment
groups were the same in the period before the shock occurs. We will show that
this assumption is convincing in this set-up both graphically than parametrically.
The implementation of the DSP rules in term of mixed accrual basis allows mu-
nicipalities to autonomously decide what kind of expenditure manipulate in order
to achieve the target imposed by the central government. According to Oxley and
Martin (1991, p.161) “it is easier to cut-back or postpone investment spending
than it is to cut current expenditures”and from figure 3 we can see that DSP on
average had a significant effect on total starting value for public works. It is rea-
sonable to use it as an instrument for the endogenous total starting value variable.
The first stage regression is the following:
TotalStartingV alueit = γ1 + γ2(DSP ∗ Post)it + γ3(AnomalyExclusion)it+
γ4(Avg#AuctionsPerWinner)it + γ5(ProbLocalWinner)it+
γ6MunicipalityFEi + γ7Y earFEt + ǫit
(3.2)
This is the first-stage regression for total starting value. The instrument for the
total starting value in the IV analysis is the dummy DSP*Post that is equal to
one if the municipality is above 5,000 in period after the change in DSP rules
of 2008. It measures how much total amount invested in public works reduced
because of the change in DSP regulation after 2008. The variable is zero before
2009 for all municipalities. Starting from 2009 it is equal to one for municipalities
affected by DSP but it is equal to zero in municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants.
Using the DSP as instrumental variable for total starting value we are assuming
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that the DSP had no other effect on firm dynamics outcomes than through its
effect on local investments. It is crucial to highlight that any factor affecting all
Italian municipalities in the same way, such as the economic crises of 2008 or the
reduction in national funds, will be captured by the yearly fixed effects and they
don’t invalidate the identification strategy.
As municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants are considered as control group, only
factors changing at the same time as the DSP and exclusively interesting mu-
nicipalities above 5,000 inhabitants may be potential trouble the validity of the
identification strategy. There are no other policies changing during the period in
analysis exclusively involving municipalities in the treatment group. The main
worry is that with the change in spending constraints also cutting to national
funds are contemplated in the DSP. However these reduction in financing local en-
tities is not the novelty of the 2009-2011 regulation and already before this period
municipalities were affected by decreasing funds.
To test the common trend assumption we estimate a so-called falsification exercise
only using the pre-treatment period observations and moving the DSP shock from
2009 to 2005. Table 2 presents results of this experiment and shows that all
coefficients are not statistical significant, except for the variable exit rate for all
firms. The results support the assumption that differential trends are not a threat
for our findings.
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3.6 The Effect of Investment in Public Works on
Firm Outcomes
An interesting starting point for the empirical analysis is the comparison between
firms’ outcomes in municipalities subject to DSP regulation and outcomes of firms
in municipalities without financial spending constraints. Figure 4 shows the evo-
lution of entry rate in the two group of municipalities (red line for municipalities
subject to the DSP regulation, blue line for unconstrained municipalities). The
left panel of the figure shows that the path for the two set of municipalities is
very similar between 2002 and 2011. On average both line are decreasing over the
entire period, however different in levels. Municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants
exhibit lower entry rates than municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants. The right
panel shows the trend in entry rate for construction firms in different groups of
municipalities. Before 2008 the ratio of new and existing firms is always higher
in municipalities under DSP rules than in municipalities not affected by the DSP,
also the drop between 2007 and 2008 is almost the same in the two groups of
municipalities. However after 2008 the two trends converge and in 2011 entry rate
is higher in municipalities above the threshold of eligibility for the DSP than in
big cities.
Figure 5 presents the evolution of exit rate for all firms (on the left) and for
construction firms only (on the right). It is clear from the data that the path for
this variable is much more regular in trends than in levels. One explanation for
this evidence is that the variable “exit rate” is representative of firms’ mortality
in the long-run more that in the short-term because it is defined as the percentage
of firms “definitively dead” over the existing firms in the previous period. Indeed
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the procedure of “cessazione d’impresa” is more an administrative feature than
an economic issue because of its hybrid definition and the delays proper to the
bankruptcy process. In other words it is reasonable than a firm is effective dead but
it is already present in the “Firms’ Register”. This is the main reason because we
are not able to draw a conclusive result about the exit side of the firm dynamics.
However our data fully grab what happens from the entry side and also give
important signals about the complete firms turnover.
Figure 6 and 7 show the pattern for two indicators of the firms’ turnover. From
the first figure we note that the evolution of the difference between exit and entry
rate is increasing both for all firms and for construction firms only. However the
right panel highlights the increasing divergence in the evolution after 2008 between
municipalities under DSP regulation and municipalities not affected by the DSP.
This tendency is more clear from the second figure that represents the trend in the
ratio between exit and entry rate. After 2008 municipalities under DSP regulation
broaden their gap in the turnover index with respect to non DSP municipalities.
Indeed in municipalities with DSP constraints the ratio between exit and entry
rate grows from 1.2 in 2008 to almost 1.5 in 2011 while in municipalities without
DSP rules the same ratio is stable aroud 1.1. From this feature is also of interest
the evidence that emerges comparing the pattern of the index between all firms and
construction firms: while for all firms the ratio between exit rate and entry rate
is always higher in municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants than in municipalities
above 5,000 inhabitants, the opposite is true for construction firms. This indicates
that in the sector of constructions the rate of turnover is higher in bigger cities
than in little municipalities, and the difference in between them increase after
2008.
The graphical analysis suggests that new firm formation in DSP municipalities
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worsen after the change in DSP regulation but there are no clear patterns on the
effect of a reduction in investment in public works on aggregate firms’ mortality.
It is important to stress that the figures understate the variation we are using in
the regression analysis. Table 3 reports regression results of this reduced form8.
The DSP constraints have a strong and negative impact on the total value invested
by Italian municipalities in public works. The impact of the change in DSP rules
to calculate spending limits of local entities is always economic significant and
somewhere statistically significant at 1 percent level. The variable we are interested
in is strongly affected with the expected sign: the new entry rate for all firms
decrease by 0.343 (with respect a mean of 7.606) and the new entry rate for
construction firms decreases by 0.563 percent points (with respect a mean of 9.016).
Table 2 shows the estimates from the falsification test where we estimate the effect
of a false shock in DSP regulation in 2005 using only pre-2009 years and investi-
gate whether municipalities which later experienced the change in DSP regulation
were already on a descending trend before 2009 in term of investment in public
works and other variables. The results suggest that none coefficient is statistically
significant, the only troubling variable is the exit rate. This is a strong signal that
the change in DSP regulation is a valid sourse of variation in the total starting
value of investments in public works.
8The reduced form is the simple D-i-D model:
Outcomeit = θ1 + θ2(DSP ∗ Post)it + θ3(DSP )i + θ4(Post)t+
θ5(AnomalyExclusion)it + θ6(Avg#AuctionsPerWinner)it + θ7(ProbLocalWinner)it+
θ8MunicipalityFEi + θ9Y earFEt + ǫit
(3.3)
where DSPi is a dummy indicating whether the municipality i is DSP constrained; Postt is
a dummy equal to one if the period is after the 2008 treatment and zero otherwise. This is
the simple D-i-D methodology with some control variables (Anomaly Exclusion, Number of
Auctions Per Winners and Probability to have a local winner) and both municipalities and time
fixed effects.
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Following the strategy adopted by Waldinger (2010) we evaluate the effect of
DSP capital expenditure constraints on firm dynamics using an IV approach. To
overcome the endogeneity issue we use the DSP after 2008 as an instrument for
total starting value. Column (1) of table 4 presents first stage regression equivalent
to equation (2) introduced in the previous section. As expected the change in
DSP regulation has a strong and really significant effect on average level of total
investment in public works (on average -1 million of euros).
Tha main challange of our strategy relates to the possibility that some firms may
have reacted to the decreasing of demand for public works by municipalities subject
to DSP by bidding for auctions in municipalities not affected by DSP. This is the
main weakness of our data because we only have informations on the aggregate
firm dynamics by municipality. Because of this peculiarity of the data structure,
we consider appropriate to focus our analysis on the “entry side”. Indeed we are
unable to draw any conclusion regarding the“exit side” of the firm dynamics. In
order to address this issue we claim that further attention need to be posed on the
exit side, from a micro prospective. Column (1) also reports that the first-stage F
statistics is 21.33, which suggests that the IV-LATE estimates are not affected by
the weak instruments problem.
Columns (2)-(5) report the IV results for the following outcome: ratio between
exit and entry rate, difference between exit and entry rate, exit rate and entry
rate. For each variable of interest we present results for all firms and coefficients
concerning only construction firms. As suggested in Imbens and Lemieux (2008)
we compute standard errors that are robust for the presence of an unknown form
of heteroskedasticity, clustered at municipality level.
Column (2) reports results for the effect of the DSP on the ratio between exit and
Chapter 3 Capital Expenditure and New Firm Formation 74
entry rate. The reduction in investment for public works seems to not influence the
general relationship between exit and entry for all firms in the market. However
the construction sector experiences a significant change in its firms composition.
The coefficient of -0.008 indicates that a one standard deviation decrease in total
starting value increase the ratio between exit and entry rate for construction firms
by about 0.42 percentage points. This is a strong and very sizeable effect (39%)
because the average municipality shows about a turnover index about 1. As regard
the difference between exit and entry rate, both coefficients relative to all firms and
construction firms show the expected sign but they are not statistically significant.
Column (4) gives us a puzzling evidence about the effect of DSP on average firm’s
exit rate in Italian municipalities. The results show that the the decrease in
investment for public works impacts all firms in local entities with an unexpected
sign. A one standard deviation decrease in total starting value for public works
also decrease the exit rate by about 1 percentage point (relative to an average of
around 7%, corresponds to an increase by 14%). From column (3) we note that
DSP has no effect on the exit rate of construction firms. However, these results
don’t prove that DSP is not affecting firms’ structure and their mortality. The
main problem with the variable “exit rate” is that it includes only firm completely
deleted from the “Italian Firms’ Register” and this is not a signal of the firm
mortality9
Column (5) shows the effect of total investment in public works on entry rate.
Total investment in public works has a positive and statistically significant effect
on the entry rate both for all firms and for construction firms only. The standard
deviation in total starting value is about 5.2 (million Euros). A one standard
deviation decrease in total starting value therefore decreases the entry rate by 1.6
9
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percentage points and this corresponds to an average decrease in entry rate for all
firms by 21%. The result for construction sector firms is again significant. A one
standard deviation in total starting value cause an opposite variation in entry rate
by 2.6 percentage points and this corresponds to an average variation in entry rate
by 29%.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we try to explain variation in rates of new construction firm formation
across both municipalities (small municipalities vs large municipalities) and time
(before and after change in DSP regulation) using a unique panel dataset. We
combine D-i-D and IV strategies to produce to identify the effect of investment in
public works on firm dynamics.
After 2008 the DSP rules, imposed by Italian central governments to local entities,
took a turn to grasping spending constraints. We first show that DSP rules have
negative impact on investment in public works. Then we use the exogenous vari-
ation in the value of auctions for public works to estimate its effect on new firm
formation. We also keep an eye on the relationship between new firm formation
and firm mortality from an aggregate prospective. Consisting with our hypothesis,
we find that new firm formation is affected by reduction in investment in public
works, and construction firms are more influenced than other sectors.
Our results contribute to explain the role of public spending austerity on firm
opportunities. The existing literature argue that the direction of the relationship
between local government spending and new firm formation is not determined
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(Reynolds, 1994). With our data and our empirical analysis we find that there is
a “causal” relationship between local government spending and new firm creation.
We claim that more attention should be posed on the effect of the central govern-
ment austerity on firm dynamics. We believe that central government austerity
together with the “relative discretion”left to local governments is not effective in
controlling public spending waste. Future research should explore: (1) the effect
of local government expenditures on firms bankruptcy, using micro-data at firm
level. (2) the indirect effect of DSP on public spending composition.
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Table A.1: Domestic Stability Pact Evolution
Year 1999-2001 2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 2009-2011
Covered Municipalities all > 5, 000 > 5, 000 > 5, 000 > 5, 000 > 5, 000
100% 29% 29% 29% 29% 29%
The main Target
Budget Balance X X X
Expenditure cap
-Current expenditures X X X X X
-Capital expenditures X X X
Mixed Competence Method
Target period 2003-2005 2007
Specific balance target X
Enforcement
Monitoring X X
Monetary Punishment X X
Public list of non compliants X
Notes. The Domestic Stability Pact (DSP) is the regulation introduced in Italy in 1999 as response to the
European Stability and Growth Pact. Almost all local goverments (regions, provinces and municipalities) were
interested by the new fiscal discipline. Till 2005 the main target of this regulation was the growth of Fiscal gap.
In years 2005-2006 central government arouse its interest also in expenditures cap. A turning point in favor of
the tight control of local spending both in term of rules and monitoring is the period 2009-2011. In this period, in
spite of the persuasive monitoring, local goverments were allowed to decide how to reach their objectives. They
autonomously decided which type of local spending manipulate in order to respect the DSP.
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Table A.2: Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Type of contracting authority
Municipality 0.621 0.485 371522
Province 0.105 0.307 371522
Region 0.023 0.149 371522
Other 0.251 0.433 371522
Location
North East 0.164 0.37 371522
North West 0.246 0.43 371522
Centre 0.153 0.36 371522
South 0.288 0.453 371522
Islands 0.149 0.356 371522
Type of contracts
Roads Rails 0.213 0.41 371522
Buildings 0.164 0.37 371522
Hydrics 0.096 0.295 371522
Culture 0.03 0.171 371522
Energy Tech 0.045 0.208 371522
Green 0.01 0.099 371522
Other 0.558 0.497 371522
Outcomes
Total Starting Value (in 100thousand euros) 5.272 14.966 371522
Winning bid 18.779 10.342 193692
# Bidders 36.638 57.658 10701
Adjudication Method
Price 0.768 0.422 371522
BeautyContest 0.048 0.213 371522
Other 0.184 0.387 371522
Authomatic Exclusion
FirstPrice 0.296 0.456 371522
AverageBid 0.704 0.456 371522
NotSpecified 0 0.016 371522
Population
# Inhabitants 209,401 518,137 371522
Inhabitants>5,000 0.748 0.434 371522
Notes. All the auctions for public works tendered in Italy between the years of 2002-
2011 with public participation. Municipality is a dummy for whether the public
administration is a municipality. Province is a dummy for whether the public admin-
istration is a province. Region is a dummy for whether the public administration is
a region. Type of contracts are the technical and financial characteristics required by
the contracting authority to the bidders (OGs). In this table I report the sum of the
most frequent OG1-OG13. Among outcomes I report: Total Auction Starting Value
that is the value/reserve price set by the public administration (in 100,000 Euros),
Winning Rebate is the winning bid and is expressed as a percentage reduction form
the starting value. The winning rebate is the highest rebate in First Price Auctions,
it is the maximum rebate below the anomaly threshold T in Average Bid Auctions,
textit # Bidders is the number of bids presented in the auction. Population is the
number of resident inhabitants (year 2001) in the city of the public administration
if the contracting authority is a municipality. Inhabitants¿5,000 is a dummy for
whether the municipality is eligible for the DSP.
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 n
Total Starting Value 26.6 97.2 2.05 4.45 9.95 22.6 50.8 15956
Total # Auctions 6.09 12 1 2 3 7 12 15956
Chance to Win .775 .268 .333 .556 .889 1 1 15956
Chance to Win (Dominant Firm) .424 .312 .111 .182 .333 .5 1 15956
Avg # Auctions per Winner 1.7 1.84 1 1 1.13 1.8 3 15956
Winning Rebate 17.4 8.07 7.32 11.8 16.6 23.1 29 15956
# Bidders 39 41.8 5 12 26.1 50 88 15956
Population 20681 86545 1433 3122 7267 16900 38598 15956
North-West .25 .43 0 0 0 0 1 15956
North-East .095 .29 0 0 0 0 0 15956
Centre .12 .32 0 0 0 0 1 15956
South .26 .44 0 0 0 1 1 15956
Islands .16 .37 0 0 0 0 1 15956
Notes. All municipalities between 2002 and 2011. Total Starting Value is the total amount yearly put up
for public works auctions; Total # Auctions is the total number of contracts for public works announced
by year. Chance to win is the average probability of winning an auction for a whichever bidder. Chance to
win for the dominant bidder is the average probability of winning the auction for the winner dominating
the market, that is the firm that wins more often in a given city. Avg # Auctions per Winner is the
average number of auctions adjudicated by each winner in the municipalities. Winning Rebate is the
average level of winning bid and is expressed as a percentage reduction form the starting value. textit #
Bidders is the average number of bids presented in the auction at municipality level. Population is the
number of resident inhabitants (year 2001) in the city and its location .
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Table A.4: DSP Municipalities Vs No-DSP Municipalities
Municipalities Municipalities
below 5,000 above 5,000
Total Starting Value Mean 8.9 37.8
p50 5.8 14.8
Std Dev 10.3 123
Total # Auctions Mean 3.11 7.98
p50 2 5
Std Dev 2.4 14.9
Chance to Win Mean .792 .765
p50 1 .833
Std Dev .272 .264
Chance to Win (Dominant Firm) Mean .54 .351
p50 .5 .25
Std Dev .319 .285
Avg # Auctions per Winner Mean 1.62 1.75
p50 1 1.2
Std Dev 1.3 2.11
Winning Rebate Mean 16.7 17.9
p50 16.2 16.8
Std Dev 8.13 7.99
# Bidders Mean 35 41.6
p50 21 29.5
Std Dev 41.2 42
Population Mean 2,517 32,154
p50 2,444 13,620
Std Dev 1,321 108,998
Notes. All municipalities. Municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants are not interested by
the DSP regulation. Municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants are subject to the fiscal and
financial restraints imposed by the DSP.
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Table A.5: Average investment per municipality before and after the
DSP twist
noDSP DSP Difference, DSP-noDSP
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)
1. Total starting value - before 9.12 39.39 30.27
Observations (4,245) (7,262)
2. Total starting value - after 8.43 33.04 24.61
Observations (1,932) (2,517)
3. Change in mean -.69 -6.35 -5.66
Notes. The table reports average total reserve price (in 100,000 Euros) puts up
for auctions in public works by municipalities below and above 5,000 inhabitants
before and after the DSP regulation in 2009. The sample consists of all italian
municipalities. Number of observations are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.6: D-i-D Estimation Results
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
ols fe fe
Total Auction Starting Value -5.659*** -12.269*** -12.400***
(1.783) (3.497) (3.490)
Mean 26.58 26.58 26.58
St. Dev. 97.20 97.20 97.20
Total #Auction -1.742*** -2.755*** -2.673***
(0.298) (0.510) (0.513)
Mean 6.090 6.090 6.090
St. Dev. 12.00 12.00 12.00
Chance to win -0.001 -0.023* -0.029**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
Mean 0.775 0.775 0.775
St. Dev. 0.268 0.268 0.268
Chance to win for the Dominant Firm 0.070*** 0.053*** 0.048***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Mean 0.424 0.424 0.424
St. Dev. 0.312 0.312 0.312
Avg # Auctions per Winner -0.007 0.060 0.082
(0.044) (0.080) (0.081)
Mean 1.697 1.697 1.697
St. Dev. 1.843 1.843 1.843
Winning Rebate 0.599* 0.975** 0.959**
(0.306) (0.411) (0.408)
Mean 17.45 17.45 17.45
St. Dev. 8.066 8.066 8.066
# Bidders 9.837*** 7.023*** 6.133**
(1.789) (2.478) (2.486)
Mean 39.05 39.05 39.05
St. Dev. 41.80 41.80 41.80
Year dummies no no yes
Observations 15,956 15,956 15,956
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.7: D-i-D with Leads & Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Value Total # Auctions Chance to Win Chance to Win Avg # Auctions Winning Rebate # Bidders
for the Dominant Firm per Winner
leads
dsp 5 10.586* 1.812*** -0.007 -0.036* -0.116 -0.375 -4.563*
(5.762) (0.633) (0.019) (0.022) (0.125) (0.505) (2.682)
dsp 6 6.497** 1.307*** -0.022 -0.072*** 0.118 -0.493 1.206
(2.942) (0.452) (0.019) (0.022) (0.108) (0.500) (2.900)
dsp 7 7.207*** 0.840** 0.005 -0.024 -0.048 0.230 -1.181
(2.579) (0.422) (0.019) (0.021) (0.117) (0.465) (2.781)
dsp 8 8.783** 0.625 -0.018 -0.024 0.051 0.406 -0.717
(3.763) (0.423) (0.019) (0.022) (0.106) (0.482) (2.786)
lags
dsp 9 5.115** 0.595* -0.022 -0.048** 0.202 0.373 -5.882**
(2.156) (0.335) (0.019) (0.023) (0.165) (0.491) (2.979)
dsp 10 0.963 -0.716** -0.055*** -0.025 0.212* 0.836 0.158
(3.177) (0.357) (0.021) (0.024) (0.110) (0.630) (3.618)
dsp 11 -6.038** -1.519*** -0.055*** 0.017 0.181 1.550** 6.726
(2.575) (0.420) (0.020) (0.025) (0.115) (0.645) (4.292)
Constant 23.001*** 5.524*** 0.818*** 0.451*** 1.480*** 17.014*** 46.299***
(1.213) (0.198) (0.014) (0.018) (0.066) (0.364) (2.199)
Observations 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956 15,956
Mean 26.58 6.090 0.775 0.424 1.697 17.45 39.05
St. Dev. 97.20 12.00 0.268 0.312 1.843 8.066 41.80
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipalities level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.8: Placebo test in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Value Total # Auctions Chance to Win Chance to Win Avg # Auctions Winning Rebate # Bidders
for the Dominant Firm per Winner
dsp post1 -1.205 -0.939*** -0.013 -0.006 0.106 0.609* 2.700
(3.001) (0.290) (0.016) (0.017) (0.111) (0.366) (1.894)
Constant 25.818*** 6.262*** 0.827*** 0.434*** 1.484*** 16.536*** 41.286***
(2.013) (0.186) (0.013) (0.014) (0.082) (0.291) (1.605)
Observations 11,507 11,507 11,507 11,507 11,507 11,507 11,507
Mean 39.05 39.05 39.05 39.05 39.05 39.05 39.05
St. Dev. 41.80 41.80 41.80 41.80 41.80 41.80 41.80
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
]
Table A.9: Parametric Test Pre-Period Parallel Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Value Total # Auctions Chance to Win Chance to Win Avg # Auctions Winning Rebate # Bidders
for the Dominant Firm per Winner
F(6, 4092) 0.70 3.48 1.02 1.58 1.74 1.61 3.21
Prob> F 0.6510 0.0020 0.4071 0.1487 0.1067 0.1393 0.0038
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Table A.10: Heterogenous Effects: FP Auctions
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
ols fe fe
Total Auction Starting Value -5.375* -6.011 -7.214**
(3.255) (4.558) (3.626)
Mean 25.06 25.06 25.06
St. Dev. 99.78 99.78 99.78
Total #Auction -0.256 -0.578 -1.203***
(0.312) (0.465) (0.452)
Mean 4.499 4.499 4.499
St. Dev. 9.169 9.169 9.169
Chance to win -0.013 -0.032* -0.025
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
Mean 0.848 0.848 0.848
St. Dev. 0.230 0.230 0.230
Chance to win for the Dominant Firm 0.015 0.010 0.038
(0.015) (0.026) (0.025)
Mean 0.527 0.527 0.527
St. Dev. 0.332 0.332 0.332
Avg # Auctions per Winner 0.000 0.023 -0.012
(0.058) (0.117) (0.137)
Mean 1.408 1.408 1.408
St. Dev. 1.626 1.626 1.626
Winning Rebate 1.218*** 1.256* 1.274**
(0.392) (0.652) (0.646)
Mean 18.05 18.05 18.05
St. Dev. 8.768 8.768 8.768
# Bidders 8.106*** 3.690 3.132
(2.123) (3.550) (3.517)
Mean 41.22 41.22 41.22
St. Dev. 45.60 45.60 45.60
Year dummies no no yes
Observations 8,251 8,251 8,251
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.11: Heterogenous Effects: AB Auctions
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
ols fe fe
Total Auction Starting Value -13.637*** -21.257*** -22.126***
(1.778) (3.869) (3.962)
Mean 18.35 18.35 18.35
St. Dev. 56.67 56.67 56.67
Total #Auction -3.134*** -4.597*** -4.811***
(0.325) (0.674) (0.695)
Mean 5.153 5.153 5.153
St. Dev. 10.76 10.76 10.76
Chance to win 0.000 -0.015 -0.008
(0.012) (0.021) (0.021)
Mean 0.789 0.789 0.789
St. Dev. 0.274 0.274 0.274
Chance to win for the Dominant Firm 0.071*** 0.057** 0.069***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.023)
Mean 0.497 0.497 0.497
St. Dev. 0.343 0.343 0.343
Avg # Auctions per Winner 0.028 0.075 0.044
(0.052) (0.121) (0.120)
Mean 1.680 1.680 1.680
St. Dev. 1.585 1.585 1.585
Winning Rebate -0.221 -0.167 -0.096
(0.370) (0.535) (0.527)
Mean 17.61 17.61 17.61
St. Dev. 8.089 8.089 8.089
# Bidders 12.638*** 9.258** 10.315***
(2.276) (3.815) (3.826)
Mean 39.57 39.57 39.57
St. Dev. 40.22 40.22 40.22
Year dummies no no yes
Observations 11,223 11,223 11,223
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.12: Robustness: Municipalities Above 1,500 Inhabitants
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
ols fe fe
Total Auction Starting Value -5.924*** -12.398*** -12.558***
Mean 28.90 28.90 28.90
St. Dev. 102.6 102.6 102.6
Total #Auction 1.799*** -2.845*** -2.768***
(0.303) (0.505) (0.508)
Mean 6.494 6.494 6.494
St. Dev. 12.61 12.61 12.61
Chance to win -0.006 -0.021 -0.027*
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Mean 0.771 0.771 0.771
St. Dev. 0.267 0.267 0.267
Chance to win for the Dominant Firm 0.074*** 0.066*** 0.061***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
Mean 0.405 0.405 0.405
St. Dev. 0.306 0.306 0.306
Avg # Auctions per Winner 0.012 0.043 0.063
(0.049) (0.085) (0.086)
Mean 1.714 1.714 1.714
St. Dev. 1.907 1.907 1.907
Winning Rebate 0.411 1.202*** 1.189***
(0.341) (0.441) (0.438)
Mean 17.53 17.53 17.53
St. Dev. 8.040 8.040 8.040
# Bidders 8.637*** 6.889** 5.954**
(2.031) (2.690) (2.698)
Mean 39.91 39.91 39.91
St. Dev. 42.07 42.07 42.07
Year dummies no no yes
Observations 14,254 14,254 14,254
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.13: Robustness: Municipalities in [2,517-32,154]
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
ols fe fe
Total Auction Starting Value -1.745** -2.383** -2.577**
(0.742) (1.070) (1.074)
Mean 15.72 15.72 15.72
St. Dev. 19.10 19.10 19.10
Total # Auction -0.981*** -1.246*** -1.242***
(0.152) (0.212) (0.213)
Mean 4.489 4.489 4.489
St. Dev. 3.805 3.805 3.805
Chance to win -0.006 -0.008 -0.008
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017)
Mean 0.778 0.778 0.778
St. Dev. 0.268 0.268 0.268
Chance to win for the Dominant Firm 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.058***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
Mean 0.428 0.428 0.428
St. Dev. 0.303 0.303 0.303
Avg # Auctions per Winner 0.001 0.023 0.022
(0.055) (0.095) (0.095)
Mean 1.662 1.662 1.662
St. Dev. 1.381 1.381 1.381
Winning Rebate 0.530 0.884 0.972*
(0.419) (0.550) (0.545)
Mean 17.07 17.07 17.07
St. Dev. 7.911 7.911 7.911
# Bidders 7.019*** 7.266** 6.325*
(2.604) (3.371) (3.382)
Mean 39.97 39.97 39.97
St. Dev. 42.74 42.74 42.74
Year dummies no no yes
Observations 10,707 10,707 10,707
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.14: Robustness: Municipalities in [2,444-13,620]
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
ols fe fe
Total Auction Starting Value 0.220 -0.164 -0.385
(0.730) (1.067) (1.058)
Mean 12.34 12.34 12.34
St. Dev. 14.35 14.35 14.35
Total # Auction -0.611*** -0.754*** -0.756***
(0.139) (0.202) (0.204)
Mean 3.730 3.730 3.730
St. Dev. 2.880 2.880 2.880
Chance to win -0.004 -0.001 -0.001
(0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
Mean 0.780 0.780 0.780
St. Dev. 0.270 0.270 0.270
Chance to win for the Dominant Firm 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.056**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.023)
Mean 0.473 0.473 0.473
St. Dev. 0.309 0.309 0.309
Avg # Auctions per Winner 0.022 0.008 0.005
(0.057) (0.101) (0.100)
Mean 1.644 1.644 1.644
St. Dev. 1.298 1.298 1.298
Winning Rebate 0.461 0.734 0.861
(0.447) (0.603) (0.598)
Mean 16.66 16.66 16.66
St. Dev. 7.903 7.903 7.903
# Bidders 8.021*** 8.375** 7.633**
(2.814) (3.721) (3.745)
Mean 38.99 38.99 38.99
St. Dev. 43.29 43.29 43.29
Year dummies no no yes
Observations 7,980 7,980 7,980
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at municipality level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figures
Figure A.1: Average Bid Mechanism
Appendix A. Appendix - Chapter 2 91
Figure A.2: Total Spending for Public Works by Italian Municipali-
ties
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Figure A.3: Total Number of Auctions for Public Works
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Figure A.4: Winning Rebate
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Figure A.5: Number of Bidders
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Figure A.6: Density of the Population Around the Threshold
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Tables
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 n
Total Starting Value 25.6 92.6 1.95 4.22 9.8 22.2 49.1 18092
Total # Auctions 6 11.5 1 2 3 7 12 18092
Exit/Entry
all 1.01 .438 .621 .762 .931 1.14 1.45 18092
construction 1.07 .941 .3 .545 .882 1.29 2 18092
Exit-Entry
all -.52 2.63 -3.5 -1.99 -.503 .931 2.5 18092
construction -1.69 6.48 -8.33 -4.44 -.971 1.8 4.62 18092
Exit Rate
all 7.09 2.02 4.76 5.85 6.97 8.16 9.43 18092
construction 7.33 4.13 2.68 4.96 7.07 9.3 11.9 18092
Entry Rate
all 7.61 2.31 4.81 6.12 7.54 8.97 10.3 18092
construction 9.02 5.59 3.77 5.61 8.08 11.2 14.7 18092
Anomaly Exclusion .593 .436 0 0 .75 1 1 18092
Avg # Auctions per Winner 1.71 1.6 1 1 1.13 2 3 18092
P(Local Winner) .11 .257 0 0 0 0 .5 18092
Notes. I consider informations about the number of firms yearly registered, active, new entry and
expired in Italian Municipalities between 2000 and 2012. Total Starting Value is the value/reserve
price set by the public administration (in 100,000 Euros). Total Number of Auctions is the
average total number of auctions tendered by each municipality by year. Entry Rate at year t
is defined as the percentage ratio between the number of new firms at time t and the number
of firms active at time t− 1. Exit Rate at year t is defined as the percentage ratio between the
number of expired firms at time t and the number of firms active at time t− 1.
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Table B.2: Placebo test in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tot value Exit rate/Entry rate Exit rate-Entry rate Exit rate Entry rate
all construction all construction all construction all construction
Dsp Post2004 -0.408 -0.034 -0.069 0.092 -0.381 0.228** 0.058 0.136 0.439
(2.048) (0.026) (0.049) (0.147) (0.375) (0.110) (0.263) (0.108) (0.294)
Anomaly Exclusion -11.319 -0.027 0.016 -0.312** 0.118 -0.130 -0.243 0.182* -0.361
(7.152) (0.024) (0.063) (0.137) (0.351) (0.104) (0.235) (0.100) (0.283)
Avg # Auctions per Winner 0.512 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.036 0.001 0.010 -0.022** -0.026
(0.373) (0.002) (0.005) (0.015) (0.034) (0.012) (0.024) (0.010) (0.027)
P (Local Winner) -1.887 -0.016 -0.010 -0.143 -0.016 -0.185* -0.179 -0.041 -0.162
(2.949) (0.026) (0.046) (0.144) (0.347) (0.110) (0.235) (0.107) (0.265)
Constant 27.763*** 1.171*** 1.276*** 0.556*** -0.045 7.798*** 8.586*** 7.242*** 8.632***
(3.020) (0.022) (0.052) (0.134) (0.345) (0.103) (0.234) (0.095) (0.270)
Observations 13,499 13,499 13,499 13,499 13,499 13,499 13,499 13,499 13,499
Mean 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.184
St. Dev. 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114
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Table B.3: Reduced Form
Outcomes (1) (2) (3)
Sample 2 ols fe fe
Total Auction Starting Value -5.823*** -11.333*** -11.523***
(1.552) (2.903) (2.934)
Mean 25.60 25.60 25.60
St. Dev. 92.61 92.61 92.61
Exit rate/Entry rate -0.012 -0.032 -0.039
all firms (0.019) (0.026) (0.026)
Mean 1.007 1.007 1.007
St. Dev. 0.438 0.438 0.438
construction firms 0.182*** 0.093 0.089
(0.040) (0.057) (0.057)
Mean 1.066 1.066 1.066
St. Dev. 0.941 0.941 0.941
Difference between Exit and Entry rates 0.238** 0.159 0.109
all firms (0.105) (0.132) (0.130)
Mean -0.520 -0.520 -0.520
St. Dev. 2.627 2.627 2.627
construction firms 0.771*** 0.473 0.439
(0.259) (0.305) (0.304)
Mean -1.690 -1.690 -1.690
St. Dev. 6.478 6.478 6.478
Death rate -0.009 -0.192* -0.234**
all firms (0.084) (0.115) (0.114)
Mean 7.086 7.086 7.086
St. Dev. 2.020 2.020 2.020
construction firms 0.249 -0.049 -0.124
(0.175) (0.229) (0.228)
Mean 7.326 7.326 7.326
St. Dev. 4.131 4.131 4.131
New entry rate -0.247*** -0.351*** -0.343***
all firms (0.085) (0.096) (0.096)
Mean 7.606 7.606 7.606
St. Dev. 2.315 2.315 2.315
construction firms -0.522** -0.522** -0.563**
(0.213) (0.226) (0.226)
Mean 9.016 9.016 9.016
St. Dev. 5.585 5.585 5.585
Year Effects no no yes
Observations 18,092 18,092 18,092
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Table B.4: Instrumental Variables
First Stage Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Starting Value Exit/Entry Exit-Entry Exit Rate Entry Rate
all construction all construction all construction all construction
Dsp*Post -11.523***
(2.495)
Total Starting Value 0.003 -0.008* -0.009 -0.038 0.020** 0.011 0.030*** 0.049**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.024) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.020)
Anomaly Exclusion -10.342*** 0.006 -0.127** -0.337*** -0.415 0.130 -0.061 0.467*** 0.354
(3.702) (0.026) (0.058) (0.129) (0.312) (0.122) (0.211) (0.129) (0.271)
Avg # Auctions per Winner 0.459 -0.000 0.007 0.020 0.049 -0.012 -0.010 -0.032** -0.060**
(0.330) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.033) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) (0.029)
P (Local Winner) 0.889 -0.012 0.009 -0.028 0.123 -0.085 0.115 -0.057 -0.008
(2.230) (0.018) (0.038) (0.090) (0.214) (0.081) (0.148) (0.089) (0.186)
F-first stage 21.33
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipalities FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092 18,092
Number of groupcity 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597 3,597
Mean 9.777 1.043 1.066 -0.520 -1.690 7.086 7.326 7.606 9.016
St. Dev. 52.278 0.553 0.941 2.627 6.478 2.020 4.131 2.315 5.585
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figures
Figure B.1: Total Starting Value of Auctions for Public Works
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Figure B.2: Public Investment and New Entry Firms
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Figure B.3: Public Investment and Exit Rate
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Figure B.4: Total Starting Value
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Figure B.5: Entry Rate
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Figure B.6: Exit Rate
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Figure B.7: Difference between Exit and Entry Rate
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Figure B.8: Index of Turnover
.
5
1
1
.5
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
DSP yes DSP no
All Firms
.
5
1
1
.5
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
DSP yes DSP no
Construction Firms
Bibliography
[1] Acconcia, A., Corsetti, G. and S. Simonelli (2013). “Mafia and
Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-
Experiment”. forthcoming in American Economic Review.
[2] Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1996).“Fiscal Discipline and the Budget
Process”. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol.
86, pp 401407.
[3] Armington, C. and Z.J. Acs (2002).“The Determinants of Regional
Variation in New Firm Formation”. Regional Studies, vol.36, pp.
3345.
[4] Ashenfelter, O., Ashmore, R. and R. Filter (1997).“Contract Form
and Procurement Costs: The Impact of Compulsory Multiple Con-
tractor Laws in Construction”. The Rand Journal of Economics,
Special Issue, 28, S5-S16.
[5] Athias, L. and A. Nun˜ez (2008). “Winner’s Curse in Toll Road
Concessions”. Economic Letters, vol. 101, pp. 172174.
[6] Atkinson, P. and P. van den Noord (2001). “Managing Public Ex-
penditure: Some Emerging Policy Issues and A Framework for ”.
OECD Economics Department Working Papers 285, OECD Pub-
lishing.
[7] Audretsch, D.B. and M. Fritsch (1994). “The Geography of Firm
Births in Germany”. Regional Studies, vol. 28, pp. 359366.
[8] Balassone F. and Franco D. (2000). “Public Investment, the Stabil-
ity Pact and the Golden Rule”. Fiscal Studies, vol.21, pp 207229.
108
Bibliography 109
[9] Balassone F., Franco D. and S. Zotteri (2004). “Fiscal Rules for Sub-
national Governments: Lessons from EMU Countries”in G. Kopits
(ed.), Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets: Background,
Analysis and Prospects, Palgrave Macmillan.
[10] Belitski, M. and J. Korosteleva (2010). “Entrepreneurial Activity
Across European Cities”. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research,
vol. 30(4). Article 12.
[11] Bertrand, M., Duflo, E. and S. Mullainathan (2004). “How Much
Should We Trust Difference-in-Differences Estimates?”. Quarterly
Journal of Economics. MIT Press, vol. 119 (1), pp 249275.
[12] Binmore, K. and P. Kempler (2002). “The Biggest Auction Ever:
The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences”. The Economic Jour-
nal, vol.112, pp 7496.
[13] Blanchard, O. and F. Giavazzi (2004). “Improving the SGP Through
a Proper Accounting of Public Investment”. CEPR Discussion Pa-
per No 4220.
[14] Bulow,J. and P. Klemperer (1996). “Auctions versus negotiations”.
American Economic Review, vol. 86, pp. 180194.
[15] Cameron, L. (2000). “Limiting Buyer Discretion: Effects of Perfor-
mance and Price in Long-Term Contracting”. American Economic
Review, vol. 90, pp. 265281.
[16] Chodorow-Reich, G. et al. (2011). “Does state fiscal relief during
recessions increase employment? Evidence from the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act”. American Economic Journal: Eco-
nomic Policy Forthcoming.
[17] Conley, T. G. and F. Decarolis (2012). “Detecting Bidders’ Groups
in Collusive Auctions”. Mimeo.
[18] Conley, T. and B. Dupor (2011). “The American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act: Public sector jobs saved, private sector jobs fore-
stalled”. University of Western Ontario and Ohio State University.
Bibliography 110
[19] Coviello, D. and M. Mariniello (2013). “The Role of Publicity Re-
quirement on Entry and Auctions Outcomes”.Forthcoming on the
Journal of Public Economics.
[20] Da Rin, M. , Di Giacomo, M. and A. Sembenelli (2011). “En-
trepreneurship, firm entry, and the taxation of corporate income:
Evidence from Europe”. Journal of Public Economics, pp. 10481066.
[21] Decarolis, F. (2012).“Awarding Price, Contract Performance and
Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions”W˙orking Pa-
per, U Wisconsin.
[22] De Hann J., Sturm J.E. and B.J. Sikken (1996). “Government Cap-
ital Formation: Explaining the Decline”. Review of World Eco-
nomics, vol.132, pp 5574.
[23] Djankov,S., Ganser, T., McLiesh, C. Ramalho,R. and A. Shleifer
(2010).“The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and En-
trepreneurship”. American Economic Journal, vol. 2, pp. 3164.
[24] Doms, M., Lewis, E. and A. Robb (2010). “Local Labor Force
Education, New Business Characteristics, and Firm Performance”.
Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 67, pp. 6177.
[25] Donald, S. and K. Lang (2007).“Inference with Difference in Differ-
ences and Other Panel Data”. Review of Economics and Statistics,
vol. 89, pp. 221233.
[26] Eichengreen, B. and C. Wyplosz (1998). “Stability Pact: more than
a Minor Nuisance?”. Economic Policy, vol. 26, pp. 67104.
[27] Feyrer, J. and B. Sacerdote (2011). “Did the stimulus stimulate?
Real time estimates of the effects of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act”. National Bureau of Economic Research, No. w
16759.
[28] Fernald, J.G. (1999). “Roads to Prosperity? Assessing the Link be-
tween Public Capital and Productivity”. American Economic Re-
view, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pp. 619-638.
Bibliography 111
[29] Fishback, P. and V. Kachanovskaya (2010). “In Search of the Mul-
tiplier for Federal Spending in the States During the New Deal”.
NBER Working Paper No.16561.
[30] Garc´ıa, A. B. (2013).“Analyzing the Determinants of Entrepreneur-
ship in European Cities”.Small Business Economics, vol. 7, pp.
389407.
[31] Garofoli, G. (1994).“New Firm Formation and Regional Develop-
ment: the Italian Case”. Regional Studies, vol. 28, pp 381393.
[32] Grembi, V., Nannicini, T. and U. Troiano (2012). “Policy Responses
to Fiscal Restraints: A Difference-in-Discontinuities Design”. IZA
Discussion Papers, 6952.
[33] Guasch, J. L., J.J. Laffont and S. Straub (2003). “Renegotiation of
Concession Contracts in Latin America”. World Bank Policy Re-
search Working Paper 3011.
[34] Guesnier, B. (1994).“Regional Variation in New Firm Formation”.
Regional Studies, vol. 28(4), pp. 347358.
[35] Hong, H. and M. Shum (2002). “Increasing Competition and the
Winners Curse: Evidence from Procurement”. Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 69 (4), pp. 871898.
[36] Kagel, J.H. and D. Levin (1986). “The Winner’s Curse and Pub-
lic Information in Common Value Auctions”. American Economic
Review, vol. 76, pp. 894920.
[37] Kneller, R. and D. McGowan (2011).
[38] Kopits, G. (2001).“Fiscal rules: useful policy framework or unnec-
essary ornament?”. International Monetary Fund, 2001.
[39] Leduc, S. and D. Wilson (2013). “Roads to prosperity or bridges to
nowhere? theory and evidence on the impact of public infrastructure
investment”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual University of Chicago
Press, vol. 27(1), pp. 89 - 142.
Bibliography 112
[40] McAfee, R. P. and J. McMillan (1986). “Bidding for Contracts: a
Principal-Agent Analysis”. Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 17, pp.
326338.
[41] McCrary (2008). “Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Re-
gression Discontinuity Design: A Density Test”. Journal of Econo-
metrics, vol. 142.
[42] Oxley, H. and J.P. Martin (1991). “Controlling Government Spend-
ing and Deficits: Trends in the 80s and Prospects for the 90s”.
OECD Economic Studies, vol. 17, pp. 14589.
[43] Reynolds, P. (1994).“Autonomous firm Dynamics and Economic
Growth in the United States, 1986-1990”. Regional Studies, 122.
[44] Reynolds, P., Story, D.J. and P. Westhead (1994). “Cross-National
Comparisons of the Variation in New Firm Formation Rates”. Re-
gional Studies, vol. 28, pp. 443556.
[45] Reynolds, P., Miller, B. and W.R. Maki (1995).“Explain-
ing Regional Variation in Business Births and Deaths: U.S.
19761988”.Small Business Economics, vol. 7, pp. 389407.
[46] Rodden, J. (2002). “The dilemma of fiscal federalism: grants and
fiscal performance around the world”. American Journal of Political
Science, vol. 46.
[47] Rosenthal, S.S. and A. Ross (2010). “Violent Crime, Entrepreneur-
ship, and Cities”. Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 67, pp. 135149.
[48] Serrato, J.C.S. and P. Wingender (2011). “Estimating the incidence
of government spending”. Mimeo.
[49] Shoag, D. (2010). “The Impact of Government Spending Shocks:
Evidence on the Multiplier from State Pension Plan Returns”.
Working Paper, Harvard University.
[50] Spulber, D. F. (1990). “Auctions and Contract Enforcement”. Jour-
nal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 6, pp. 325344.
Bibliography 113
[51] Wilson, D. J. (2012). “Fiscal Spending Jobs Multipliers: Evidence
from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act”. Ameri-
can Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4(3): 251-82.
[52] Wyplosz, C. (2012). “Fiscal Rules: Theoretical Issues and Historical
Experiences”. NBER Working Paper 17884.
